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Abstract 
Each of the three independent chapters of this dissertation examines or jus-
tifies cooperative behavior in one of two specific public goods environments. 
The first chapter presents cxprrimf'ntal evidence documenting a subject's 
behavior when faced with simpk games that require turn taking for efficiency. 
Both symmetric and asymmdric games as well as games with explicit pun-
ishmf'nt actions are studied and compared. The length of the game is a 
treatment variable; experiments simulating onr-shot, finite and infinite rep-
etition games an' conducted. Group outcomrs arc sorted by the player's 
average payoffs and the importance of focal solution concepts like group wel-
fare, equality, and symmetry arc inferred. Individual strategies uscd in the 
experiments are also sorted and compared enabling a discussion of cndgame 
effects and conflict within the games. 
Standard non-cooperativc gamf' theory IS not selective enough to dis-
criminate among many of the possible outcomes of the games examined in 
Chapter One. fielying on focal and axiomatic solution concepts allows dis-
crimination, yet these procedures are inherently ad-hoc. The second chapter 
examines the outcome to a population game with evolutionary dynamics in 
v 
order to theorcticly justify the results of the first chapter in a less ad-hoc 
manner. In particular, the second chapter applies the Replicator Dynamic. 
It is shown that under an assumption of limited rationality, specifically lim-
ited memory, there is a unique' global equilibrium. The unique equilibrium 
contains a trio of outcomes: non-cooperative Nash play, payoff irrational 
play, and cooperative turn-taking. 
The third chapter presents findings from a second series of experiments, 
a series designed to study free riding and the voluntary contribution mech-
anism. In the experimPnLal environment, subjects arc randomly assigned 
constant marginal rates of substitution between the public and the private 
good. These random assignments arc changed each decision pcriod , allowing 
the measurement of player response functions. These response functions are 
analogous to the bidding functions obtained in private good, sealed-bid auc-
tion experiments. The results are quite different from the results of others 
in environments with little or no heterogeneity. There is much more free 
riding, very little evidence of decay across periods, and only sparse evidence 
of anomalous behavior such as spliU ing and spite. 
VI 
Contents 
1 An Experimental Analysis of Two- Person Reciprocity 
Games 
1.1 Reciprocity Gamf's 
1.2 Rela ted Research . 
1.3 The Experimental D('sign 
1.3.1 Equilibria 
1.4 The Experiments 
1.5 The Results ... 
1.5.1 The One-Shot Treatment . 
1.5.2 
1..5.:3 
1 .. 5..1 
T he Fin itf' and lnfinite Repetition Treatments: Aver-
age Payoffs . . . . . . . .. 
Comparing A vcragf' Payoffs 
The Finite and Infini te Repetition Treatments: The 
Strategy Space 
1.6 Conclusions 
1. 7 Referencf's . 















1.9 Tables . 
1.10 Figure's . 
V II 
2 A Bounded Rationality, Evolutionary Model for Behavior in 
Two Person Reciprocity Games 
2.1 Population Game's and the Rcplicator Dynamic 
2.2 The Envi ronment 
2.3 The Replicator 
2.3.1 Other SymmC't ric Games 






3 Anomalous Behavior in Linear Public Goods Experiments: 
How Much and Why? 
3.1 Introduction 
3.2 Background 
3.3 Our Design and ProcC'durcs 
3.4 Responsc Funct ions oncl n ackground Noisc 




















3 .. 5. 1 Some basC'IinC's 88 
3 .. 5.2 Est imation of rC'sponse functions from aggrC'ga tC' data 91 
V III 
3 .. 5.3 Response Functions an d Errors: Individual Level Anal-
ysis ... . ... . ....... . 
3 .. 5.4 Comparison to Previous Results 
3.6 Interpreting the Results 
3. 7 References . . . . . . 
3.8 Sample Instructions . 
3.9 Tables . 









List of Tables 
1.1 Payoff tables for G1 , 0 2 , G3 and G4 . 33 
1.2 Experimental Design . . . . . . . . . 31 
1.3 The distribution of outcomes in the one-shot treatments. 35 
1.4 Individual strategy choices, One-Shot treatments. 36 
1.5 Distribution of outcomes, finite and infinite repetition treat-
ments. . .... 37 
1.6 Average payoffs. 18 
1.7 Individual strategy choin's, Finite Repetition treatnwnts. 39 
1.8 End of game effccts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ·10 
1.9 Individua l strategy choices, Infinite Repetition treatments. . 41 
2.1 The eight machines or strategies contained in 8 8 . 
2.2 The environment II. 
3.1 Experimental design . . .............. . 
3.2 Analysis of Splits. All data with endowment nine. 
3.3 Analysis of Splits. Endowment = 9, MRS > 1. 








3.5 Splitting behavior in t hf' Isaac and Wai!.::Pr data. 116 
3.6 Spiteful behavior. . 117 
3.7 Sacrificial behavior. 118 
3.8 Probit models. . . . 119 
3.9 The raw number of classification errors for the first repdition 
oftrPa.tment{6,1} .................... ... 120 
3.10 The raw number of classifi cation errors for the first repetition 
of treatment {6, 9} . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 
3.11 Contribution rates. Comparison to 1\V data, when ~1RS = 
1.33 and l\JRS = :3.33 ........... . .......... 122 
XI 









The outcomes to the rrpeated treatments of G1 . 
The outcomes to the repeated treatments of G3 . 
The outcomes to the rqwated treatments of G2 . 
The out comes to the rq)('a ted treatments of G 4 . 
Phase portrait for Example. . . ........ . 
Phase portrait for C'ountf'r-Example, initial generation /\.. 
Phase portrait for Counter-Example, initial generation B . 
Cutpoint analysis: aggregate level ............ . 









treatments with an endowment condition of one .. . . .. .. . 125 
3.:3 Classification errors aggregated over all subjects sho\\"n for all 
treatments with an endowment condition of nine. 
3.4 The aggregate percentage of tokens invested in the public ex-
change v.c;. the marginal rate of substitution, plotted for both 
the enclownwnt of onf' and the endowment of nine conclit ions. 
126 
v = 3 ................................ 127 
XII 
3.5 The aggregate percentage of tokens invested in the public ex-
change vs. the marginal rate of substitution, plotted for both 
the endowment of one and the endowment of nine conditions. 
v = 6 ..................... . .......... 128 
3.6 The aggregate percentage of tokens invested in the public ex-
change vs. the marginal rate of substitution, plotted for hath 
the endowment of one and the endowment of nine conditions . 
v = 10. 
3.7 The aggregate percentage of tokens invested in the publi c ex-
change vs. the marginal rate of substitution, plotted for both 
the endowment of one and the endowment of nine conditions. 
v = 10. 
3.8 The different response functions generated by Probit l\lodcl 
. 129 
130 
No. 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 131 
3.9 Estimated cutpoints nwasurcd as deviation from Nash play (in 
token value units). All data .................... 132 
3.10 Estimated cutpoints measured as deviation from Nash pla.v (in 
token value units). Experience effects.. 133 
3.11 Classification errors. 134 
3.12 Replication of homogeneous preference experiments with V = 
6, 1· = 20, X = 9 (MRS= 3.3). . 135 
3.13 Empirical response function with (reveal) and without (no re-
veal) publicly reported token values. . ........... . . 136 
1 
Chapter 1 
An Experimental Analysis of 
Two-Person Reciprocity 
Games 
1.1 Recipro c ity Games 
As described in Ostrom (1990), the farmers near the city of Valc>ncia, Spain 
take turns directing water from canals onto their fields. \Vhen one farmer 
ha.s taken all the water he needs, the next farnwr, who has lwcn waiting, 
gets to take a.ll the water he needs. There is obvious temptation for the 
waiting farmers to try to take water out of turn ; Valencia. is hot and dry and 
the crops are in constant clang<'r, especially in drought years. R<'markably 
enough these turn-taking schemes have survived for centuries. 
The purpose of the turn-taking scheme is to insure an effici<'nt. or at least 
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near efficient, use of the water supply. Without the agreement to rotate, 
the farmers would waste valuable resources fighting amongst themselves over 
the scarce water. It is possible that farmers closC'r to the canals, or further 
upstream, would have an advantage in an unfettered contest for the water. 
The advantaged farmers might C'Ven be better off with free competition than 
with the turn-taking scheme. However, the disadvantaged farnwrs might be 
forced out of business without the turn-taking scheme, and the total amount 
of crops produced might go clown. By following the turn-taking scheme, the 
farmers avoid these potential problems. 
There are other situations in which turn-taking schemes can enable groups 
of people to t>xploit a resource to their collccti,,e advantage. Two firm s, for 
example, can alternatively offC'r monopoly price bids in a series of contract 
auctions. Without the turn-taking scheme, tlw firms would be forced to 
offer competitive price bids; the earnings of the auction's winnC'r would be 
drastically reduced. Similarly, two opposed politicians can alternatiwly vote 
against their immediate bC'sl interC'sts so that a string of bills. some of which 
please their constituents, will be assured of passage. If the politicians did 
not agree on a turn-taking sclwme, tl1<'ir votes would cancel out and perhaps 
no bills would pass. 
All these situations can lw classified under the rubric of Reciprocity 
Games. A Reciprocity Game, then, is any noncooperative situation in which 
some efficient outcomes can only be realized by utilizing nontrivial corre-
lated strategies, or turn-taking. Repeated versions of classical games like' the 
Battle of the Sexes and ChickC'n arc Reciprocity Games, pure coordination 
games like The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma ar<' not. 
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As an example of a Reciprocity Game, consider the repeated, finite action, 
two player game implied by the stage-game payoff matrix G 1 . wlwre 
G
1 
= [ (3, 3) 
(7,3) 
(3, 7) ]· 
(4,4) 
Label the actions A and B. Let Lhe top and bottom rows represent t lw payoffs 
if the row player chooses action A or B, respectivf'ly. Let the left and right-
hand columns represent thP payoffs if the column player choosrs action A or 
B , respectively. 
Assuming that both players arc rational, or expected utility maximizrrs, 
that they are non-altruistic, and t bat they have complete information abont 
the payoffs and the rationality of the other player, noncooperative game 
theory offers certain predictions about the player's behavior. The clarity of 
thPse predictions depends upon the number of times that the stage-game is 
repeated. 
If the stage-game is not repeated, each player has a dominate strategy, 
which is to choose action B. Play of this action at every sta.ge is a lso the 
unique subgame perfect equilibrium of any finite repetition game. In equi-
librium , each player receives a payoff of four in each stage. T he rquilibrium 
is efficient only in the non-repeatrd or one-shot game; in the repeated game, 
all the efficient outcomes involn' alternating bdwPen the stagr-game pay-
offs of (3, 7) and (7, :3). To gain these payoffs, both players must choose their 
dominated action, and furthermore, the players must coordinate so that they 
do not choose the clominatPcl action a.t the samP Lime. Given an even num-
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her of stages, the simple alternation scheme of having the playcrs take turns 
choosing actions A and B leads to an outcomP in which each player gets an 
average stage payoff of five . 
If the stage game is repeated an infinite number of times, the folk theorem 
implies that there a.re an infinitc number of subgame perfect equilibria. Any 
outcome that has payoffs greater than or equal to four is subgame perfect . 
In fact, there are an infinite number of effi cient subgame perfect equilibria, 
each one involving some pattern of alternation between (3, 7) and (7, :3) . 
The multiplicity of eq uilibria is in itself a probkm for the playcrs - which 
equilibrium should they coordinate on? Axiomatical concepts like symmetry, 
group welfare , or equality can be used to de termine focal points, yct, even 
with these concepts there need not be a unique equilibrium . The e fficient 
payoffs do share a common trait, however. In the e ffi cient out comes, the 
players must resort to a pattern of alternation bd ween the stagc-ga mc payoffs 
of (3, 7) and (7, 3). 
The purpose of this papcr, tlwn , is to examine the abi li ty of people to 
enter into a lternation schemes and achieve effi cient outcomes to reciprocity 
games. The games will be studiccl under three different repetil ion conditions: 
one-shot, finite repetition , and infinit e repetition. Compari sons \\'ill be made 
between a game that has symmdric payoffs and a game that has asymmetric 
payoffs. The effects of adding a t hird action , one intended to be a clear 
punishment, will also be consiclcrecl. 
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1.2 Related Research 
The previously mentioned book by Ostrom (1990) is concerned with exam-
ining the ability of people to efficiently exploit common pool resomces. She 
reviews several case histories in which groups of people are able to introduce 
rotation schemes and successfully exploit the resource. Some of lH'r examples 
have been in place for centuries. 
Ostrom el al. (1991) have abstracted from these real life examples in an 
experimental study of the usc of a common pool resource. In their study, 
rotation schemes offer an dTiciC'nt way to exploit the resourcC', oncl, in fact, 
some of the eight-person groups try to institute these schemes. Ostrom et al. 
find that these schemes fail do to mistrust, n1istakes or cheating. The authors 
find that the efficiency of thC' use of the resourcC' increases if incJi,·iduals are 
allowed to impose fines on one another; however, resource usC' never reachC's 
optimal levels. 
Murninghan et al. (1987) studiC'd modified Prisoner's Dilemmas that WC're 
in fact Reciprocity Games. Thcy found that in infinite repetition trf'atrnents 
and with the ability to communicate, subjects often resorted to oltC'rnation 
schemes, some sacrificing potential payoffs to do so. Some subjects also 
a.ttf'mpted complca: altenwlion schemes in an effort to generote more equal 
payoffs. 1 Thf'ir treatments are simi lar to the infinite repetition, symmetric 
treatment considf'rcd here. Tbf' main differences between thf' t rf'o! ments arc 
that Murninghan el al. allow communication, and also the osymnwtries in 
thC'ir payoff structure occur on thf' main diagonal. 
1Murninghan et al. , p. 17. 
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Palfrey and Rosenthal (199La; 1991b) and Cooper et al. (1000; 1980; 
1987) have studied various public goods and coordination games that with 
repetition become Reciprocity Games. Cooper et al. (1990; 1087) also exam-
ined the add it ion of an action deemed to be a punishment. They found that 
the availabili ty of the extra action did effect the players choice of strategies. 
Sclten and Stoecker (1986), in their work on finitely repeated Pri soner 's 
Dilemmas, developed a. system of outcome classification that is similar to the 
strategy classi fica.tion system usccl here. 2 
1.3 The Experimental Design 
Each offour different. payoff treatments will be examined under threc different 
repetition conditions. The four different payoff treatments arc: symmetric 
(Gt), asymmetric (G2 ), symmetric with punishment (G3), and asymmetric 
with punishment (G4 ). Each of these treatments is representcd by a payoff 
matrix in Table 1.1. The cliffercnt repetition conditions are: one-shot, finit e 
repetition, and infinite repetition. 
1.3.1 Equilibria 
The equi libria for G1 have been di sc ussed already, but for complctcncss, they 
will also be examined he re along '"ith the equilibria in the other threc games . 
2 Tn Sclton and Stoecker (1986) either a Cooperative outcome or End-Eff0ct Play occurs 
if the cooperative alternative in th0 on0-shot game is chos0n consecutively form > 4 peri-
ods during the supcrgame. Unlike Sclten and Stoecker , this paper examines the sequence 
of p lay at the individual level and makes inferences about. the types of strategies that each 
individual plays, either Alternating, o r Nash (or Other). 
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First, in the one-shot conditions of both G1 and G2 there is either a unique 
dominate strategy or dominate solvable Nash equilibria. In G1 the unique 
equilibrium is for both players to choose action B, it gives each of them a 
payoff of four. The outcome will be denoted by the pair {B, B} so that each 
player's move is reflected. In G2 the unique equilibrium, {A , B}, is for the 
row player to choose action A and get a payoff of three, and for the column 
player to choose action B and get a payoff of seven. 
Recall that the games G3 and G4 are identical to the games G 1 and G2, 
respectively, except that G3 and G 4 have an additional action available to 
the players. The action is clearly not a desirable action; if it is played, both 
players get much worse payoffs. However, the avai labi lity of the action means 
that both G3 and G4 have three equilibri a instead of only one. They share 
the equilibria. of their counterparts, namely {B,B} and {A,B}, respectively, 
plus they each have two additional equilibria. 
In G3 the additional equilibria are: {(~B, ~C), (~B, ~C)}, the fractions 
representing the weights in a. mixed strategy, and { C, C}. In G4 the ad-
ditional equilibria are: {(!A,~ C), OA, ~C)} and { C, C}. These additional 
equilibria. are dominated, in the sense that both players get higher payoffs, 
by the {B, B} equilibrium in G3 and t he {A,B} equilibrium in G4 . 
Finite repetition creates no additional equilibria. in either G1 or 111 G2. 
However, in G3 and in G4 finite repetition creates many additional equilibria.. 
In fact, due to a. finite game folk theorem, any minimax-dominating outcome 
can be approximated by a subga.me perfect equilibrium if the number of 
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stages is large enough .3 The folk theorem result causes a problrm that. is 
ve ry similar to the problem <'ncountered in the infinite repetition games, how 
do players coordinate on a particular equilibrium when the set of equi libri a 
is very la rge? 
Infinite repetition , in all four games, leads to sets of equilibria that are 
very large indeed - they an' infinite. In fact , the infinite rrpd it ion folk 
theorem says that if thr di scount rate is low enough, any outcome to a 
game which results in average stage-game payoffs which are greater than the 
minimax payoffs is supportable as a subgame perfect equilibrium . 4 Note 
3 For example, fo r G 1 repeated T >= 3 times , 
({B, A}1, {A, Bh, {B, A}J, ... , {A, B}r_1, {B, B}r] 
with the threat of playing {C, C } for each subsequent stage if there is a defection is 
subgame perfect. To he more speci fi c, in repeated versions o f o ne-shot gr~nws that have 
multiple Nash equilibri a , for any indi vidually rational and feasible outcome ·rt there exif'tf' 
a length T and a subgame perfect equilibrium such that if U is the averagf' stage payoff 
in the equilibrium , 
JJU- uJJ < £ 
for any £ > 0. T he result holds fo r two-person games and for n-person gam f's if the 
dimensionality of the payoff spae<' is equal to the number of players. For details see Benoit 
and Krishna (1985); p. 919; refer to Theorem 3.7. 
4 The eq uilibrium payoffs must be such that the following equation ho lds: 
1 6 • 
--1•· > v· + --v· 
1- 6'-' 1 -6' 
1 • 1 t t 
--,v; = --,((1- 6 )vi ,min + 0 v;) 
1- u 1 -u 
where v; is the average payoff of the equilibrium strategy given no defection, ii; is the 
maximum payoff a player can get by deviating, vi* is the average payoff of t he chosen 
punishment strategy, and 8 is the discount. rate. Equa t ion 1 says that tllf' t otr~ l payoff for 
playing the equilibrium must be grea ter than the total payoff for deviating once and then 
getting the punishment payoff for the rest of the game. For details sec Fudenbcrg a nd 
l\1as kin (1986); pp. 533- 554; refer to Theorem 1. In the infinite repetition treatments , 
the discoun t rate was ten percent. 
9 
that the minimax payoffs for G 1 through G4 arc: (4,4), (3, 7). (1~, 1 ~), and 
(1 ~, 1~)- Again, the question is: How do players coordinate on a particular 
equilibrium when the set of equilibria is very large? 
It is possible to par<' the sets of <>quilibrium outcomes down tot he manage-
able level of three or less by applying the axiomatic refinements of Equality, 
Symmetry, and Welfare Maximi?-ation, along with Pareto Optimality. The 
Equality refinement requires each player to receive the same payoff; the Sym-
metry refinement requires each player to choose their dominated action the 
same number of times; and the \V<' lfare Maximization refinem<'nt r<"'quires t he 
sum of the player's payoffs to be maximized. Pareto Optimali ty, of course, 
means that each outcome must be efficient. T he equi libri a t hat pass these 
refinements will be called focal solutions. 
Specifically, in G 1 and G3 , t lw one to one alternation scheme leads to av-
erage stage payoffs of (5, 5) an d satisfies all four of these refinem<"'nts. Forth<"' 
symm etric games, t he imposition of the refinem<'nts means th a t th e nnml)('r 
of focal solutions is the sam<' in the one-shot, finite, and infinitP repetition 
conditions . In each case, thPrc is a unique focal solution. 
On the other hand, in G2 and G4 , a one to one a lternation schC'me satisfies 
on ly the Symmetric refinement and leads to aYerage stage payoffs of ( 4, 5). 
To satisfy the Equali ty refinement requires a one lo two a.lterna t ion scheme. 
In this scheme the row playN chooses action A half as often as the column 
player chooses action B and players end up with average stage payoffs of 
(4~,43)- Furthermore, to satisfy the Welfare Maximizing rPfin<"'rnent leads 
to play of the {A, B} stage game equ ilibrium and awrage stag<" payoffs of 
(3, 7). For the asymmetric gam<"'s, the imposition of the refin<"'mC'nts means 
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that the number of focal solutions is three in the infinite repct it ion condition 
and in the finite rcpetition condition of G4 • The one-shot condition and the 
finite repetition condition of G2 have unique focal solutions. 
The behavior in the one-shot games should be considered as a calibrating 
device. The outcomcs achieved are worst case outcomes in the sense that 
there is no chance for the players to use an efficient rotation scheme. Tlw-
ory predicts that behavior will conform to the Nash Solution, which will be 
defined as Hypothesis 1. 
Although not equilibria in all cases, the following hypotheses will be con-
sidered for both the finite and infinite repetition treatments (noticc that they 
do not specify behavior in the carlicst stages of the game; they allow a period 
of time for the players to coordinat e): 
Hypothesis 1 (Nash Solution) After a a rla in pe1·iorl. ench ]Jlayer 
chooses the action wh·ich leads to th e highest Pareto-Ranked, subgame per-
fect equilibrimn. 
Hypothesis 2 (Alternating Solution) Afle1· a ce1·tain prriorl. th e out-
come to the game will have players alte1·nating between action il and act?'on 
B swh that th e realized play 11'ill be { ... , {A ,B}, {B ,A}, {A , fl} , . . . }. 
Hypothesis 3 (Welfare Solution) After a certain period, th e ovtcome to 
the game will be S1tch thai the sum of the playen:; payo.!Js is ma~rimi::ed. 
Hypothesis 4 (Equality Solution) After· a certain period, thr outcome to 
the game 1l'ill ma:rimize the sum of th e players payoffs subject to hm,ing each 
player receive th e same payo.ff. 
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Hypothesis 1 embodif's the predicted outcome in the finite repetition 
games. The Nash Solution is also an equilibrium in any of tlw infinite repe-
tition games, although it is not an efficient equilibri a in the symmetric cases. 
Hypothesis 2 embod ies the axiomatic refinement of Symmetry, it requires the 
players to adopt a one to one rotation scheme; Hypothesis 3 embodies the 
axiomatic refinement of \.Yclfare Maximization; and Ilypotlwsis 4 embodies 
the axiomatic refinement of Equality. Although not always equi libri a, these 
three solutions are efficient outcomes to the finite repetition games. 
1.4 The Experiments 
All the experiments were perfornwcl in a laboratory at the California. Insti-
tute of Technology. The experimcnts were run on a set of computers linked 
together in a. network. The subject pool consisted of students, most of whom 
were recruited from introductory economics and political science courses. 
There were nine experimental Sf'ssions: one session for each finite and infi-
nite repetition treatment of G 1, G'2 , G3 , and G4 ; and one session for all the 
one-shot treatments. The number of subjects in f'a.ch session varied from 
ten to fourteen because some recruited subjects did not show up for some 
experiments. 
The following outline describes the order of events that took place in a 
typical experimental session: 
1. Each subject entered the laboratory and sat at the tf'rminal of their 
choice. 
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2. The subj0cts were read a set of directions detailing tlw rules of the 
session. The subjects were not shown a payoff matrix, instead each 
action and payoff was explained to them independently. The subjects 
were led through two practice periods and then quizzed. 5 
3. In a period, each subject chose either A or B (or C) and was then 
informed of their payoff and partner's choice. This wa.s r<"'peatcd under 
the following conditions: 
(a) In the on0-shot treatm0nts, each subject was randomly match0d 
with another at the h<'ginning of each period. Tlw gam<"' <"'ndecl 
after US periods. 
(b) In the finite repetition treatments, each subject play<'d the same 
person each period. The game ended after 15 periods. 
(c) In the infini te repd.ition treatments, each subject play<"'d the same 
person every period. After the 15th period, a ten-sided die was 
rolled so tha.t the subjects cou ld sec the result. If a 9 was rolkd 
then the game end0cl, otherwise the game contimwd another pe-
riod after which thC'r<"' was another die roll. The ganw did not end 
until a. 9 was rolled . 
4. At the end of the game, the subjects were randomly matched with a. 
person 'vhom they had not. playccl and a not her game was st artecl . 
5 A copy of the directions and quiz used in the one-shot treatment of r..1 is included in 
the appendix. 
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5. Each subject in a session played 4 games and was then paid cash for 
each point they earned in llw experiment. In the one shot treatment s, 
the order of games was: C'1 , G3 , G 2 , and G4 . In the finite and infini te 
repe tition treatments, the subj ects played the sam e game four times. 
6. The experimental session ended. 
In the symmetric treatments, every player faced the same payoffs, so 
there was no difference between a row and a column player. Hence, in the 
symmetric treatments, all subjects were treated identically. 
On the other hand, in the asymmetric treatments, the labels row and 
column had meaning, the player unlu cky enough to be a row pla.vcr was at 
a disadvantage. In order to prcvent row players from gam bling that they 
would become column players latcr in the session. at t he beginning of each 
asymm etri c treatment half of tlw subjects were informed that they would he 
row players for all four games in t.he session. In the one-shot session , this 
di vision took place before the third game, after all the symmd ric games h ad 
b een played. 
Table 1.2 reports the number of subjects and the number of obscrvations, 
respectively, in each trea tment.. 6 An obser vation consists of t.hc out come of 
one complete game and t wo seq uen ces of actions, one for each pla~'cr involved. 
The table also shows the da tes of each session, the length , the exchange rate, 
and the order of the one-shot treatments. 
6 T here were 93 subjects tota l. An effort. was made not to have exp~>r i <' n ced players , 
however 7 d id participate in two sess ions. Two participated in 4/20/90 and 5/17/90, one 
participated in 5/17/90 and 5/18/90, and four participated in 5/11 /90 and 5/18/90. These 
people were never matched with the same person more than once, even across sessions. 
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1.5 The Results 
1.5.1 The One-Shot Treatment 
The first step is to examine the players' behavior in the one-shot treatments. 
The Table 1.3 describes the number of times each possible outcome pair was 
observed.7 
In order to determine whether or not an individual's actions changed a.s 
sjhe gained experience with the game, the data was split into t.he first eight 
periods and the last seven periods and then compared using a standard \ 2 
test.8 In no case was there a signifi can t difference between the distribution of 
actions at the beginning and the distribution of actions at thf' encl. The \'2s 
were: 0.3370 for G1 , 0.2983 for 0 2 row players, 1.2301 for G2 column play<'rs, 
1.6290 for G3, and 2.5813 for (,',1 column players. The column pla~·f'rs in G.1 
chose action B in every case. 
In G1 , fourteen of the 1.50 observations, or 9.3 percent, assigned payoffs 
below the minimax to at least one of the players. In G2 , sixteen of the 
seventy-five row player observations and six of the seventy-five column player 
observations, 21.:3 percent and 8 percent respectively, assigned payoffs below 
minimax payoffs. Assuming that the true frf'qu<'ncy of below incliviclually 
rational payoffs is the lower encl of a 95 percent confidence interval around 
these observed frequencies would ]cad to the following percentages: 5.4, 13.1, 
7 In G 1 , half of the subjects played A at least once. In G 4 , one subj ect was responsible 
for all the plays of action C. 
8 xl, here and elsewhere , is the standard test statistic using Yate's continuity correction. 
It has a x2 distribution with i d<'gre<'s of freedom. For a complete explanation o f this t.<:'st, 
see Everitt (1977) pp. 12 - 14. 
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and 2.8, respectively. 
Obviously, there is a substantial minority of players who play non-
equilibrium strategies. In an ideal environment, Hypothesis 1, that each 
player choosf's the su bgame pcrff'ct equili bri urn strategy, would he rejected 
on the basis of even one non-equilibrium play. However, the crit.nia adopted 
for this experim<"ntal environment allows their rejection only if the upper 
bound of the 95 percent conficknce interval around the observed proportion 
of plays is less than 0.95. These bounds are displayed in the Table 1.4. 
Hypothesis 1 must be rejected for G1 , and for the row players in both asym-
metric treatments. The fact that not all people always play the unique, 
subgame pf'rfect equilibrium st rakgy in one-shot games has l)ecn observed 
many times.9 
Notice the significant change' in the behavior of the column players when 
comparing G2 to G4 . In G2 , 8 pncent of the actions chosen by tlw column 
players violate the Nash Solution, in G4 no actions chosen violate' the Nash 
Solution. This is an anomaly bC'\ause behavior docs not change for the row 
player, neither docs it change' hd WC'cn G1 and G3 . One C'Xplana.tion for 
the data is that, because G2 and G4 were played in succession by the same 
players, the column players karnccl how to play according to Hypothesis 1. 
Oddly enough, the row players did not share in the revelation. 
9 Sce Ledyard (1992), Dawes (1980) and Cooper eta/. (1987; 1990). 
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1.5.2 The Finite and Infinite Repetition Treatments: 
Average Payoffs 
The outcomes to the finite and infinite repetition treatments arc representC'd 
by the average payoffs of both players. To allow a period of time for the 
players to coordinate on a specifi c outcome, the first four periods arc ignored. 
Also, so that the infinite repetition treatments remain comparable to the 
finite repetition treatments, the averaging ends with the fifteenth period (the 
finite repetition treatments were fifteen periods long). 
Referring to Figure 1.1 , t lw set of possible outcomes to C 1 if it were 
infinitely repPa.ted is represcntC'cl by the triangular figure in both the top 
and bottom diagrams. Gi,·en that a ten period average is used, the possible 
outcomes arc a subset of the triangular set. Actual outcomes to the games 
are shown by a letter representing one or more observations. The letter is 
located at the coordinates cldnminecl by the avcrage payoffs of the players. 
For an outcome to be Pardo Optimal, it must be locat·cd on the hy-
potenuse of the triangular sd. Tlw 4.5° line highlights the outconws in which 
the players receive equal payoffs. Every outcome located northeast of the 
dotted lines payoff dominates tlw minimax. These minimax dominating out-
comes, given a small enough di scount rate, are subgame perfC'ct equilibria if 
the game is infinitely repeated. 
In Figure 1.1 , the top diagram represents the outcomes of the finite repe-
tition treatment of G1 . The bottom diagram represents the outconws of tlw 
infinite repetition trcatmC'nt of C 1 . Similar figures are constructC'd for the' 
two treatments of G2 , G3 , and C 4 • 
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Note that in G 1 and G3 thcre is no difference between a row and a col-
umn player. In order to avoid drawing conclusions from arbitrarily scattercd 
outcomes, all the outcomes are located on or below the 45° line. In G2 and 
G4, there is a difference between a row and a column player. 
Again referring to Figure 1.1, specifically to the top diagram which shows 
the outcomes of the finite repet iLion treatment, notice that tlw outcomes oc-
cur in two clusters. One cluste r is located around the unique one-shot equi-
librium or Nash Solution, point ( 4, 4). The other is located around the focal 
solution, the outcome that emhodics the Alternating Solution. tlw Equality 
Solution and the Welfare Maximizing Solution, point (5, 5 ). The observations 
are divided roughly between the two clusters. Although the Nash Solution 
was the most observed ;vith five. fourtcen groups were able to improve upon 
it using some pattern of reciprocation, three actually implemcnted the focal 
solution. One player out of the t wcnty pairs recPived below mi11imax payoffs. 
The bottom diagram, which shows t he outcomes of the infinitcly repeatcd 
treatment, is in sharp contrast to the top one. Here, twenty-one of twenty-
four observations are located at the focal solution. Of the three remaining 
outcomes, two are located ncar the Nash Solution, and the last is located at 
an outcome better than thc Nash Solution but not as good as the focal so-
lu tion. The <:>xtension of the tinw- hori zon from Anite to infinitc draws many 
outcomes away from tlw Nash Solution and to the focal solution. People 
appear to have few problems implementing a rotation scheme and achiev-
ing efficient payoffs, approximately 90 percent succeed, if G\ is infinitely 
repeated. 
Figure 1.2 shows the outcomPs of the finite and infinite repdition treat-
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ments of G3 . Recall that G3 is identical to G1 except that an additional 
action, a punishment, was added to the action space. Despite Lhc additional 
strategy, Figure 1.2 closely resembles Figure 1.1. In the top diagram, the 
finite repetition treatment, thirteen of the twenty outcomes arc close to the 
focal solution. In the bottom diagram, the infinite repetition treatment, 
nineteen of the twenty-four outcomes are at Lhe focal solution. 
The top diagram in Figure 1.3 shows the outcomes of the finite repetition 
treatments of G2 , the first of the asymmetric games. Seven outcomes were 
at the Nash and \Velrare Maximi 11ing Solutions, point (7, 3). One outcome 
was at the Alternating Solution, point (5,4) . No outcomes wNe at or even 
near the Equality Solution , point ( cl~, 4~ ). 10 ]\fore than half oft he outcomes, 
eleven of twenty, have the row player receiving less than minimax payoffs. 
The bottom diagram shows ihf' outcomes to the infinite repetition treat-
ment of G'2 . Unlike in the symmetric games, there is no improvement in 
the efficiency of the outcomes as i he Lime hori zon gets longer. Roughly the 
same proportion of outcomes arc at the Nash Solution, the Alternating So-
lution, and the Equality Solution (eight, two, and zero observations out of 
twenty-four, rcspectiYely) as in the finite repetition treatment. Again, half 
of the outcomes ha,·c the row player receiving less than minimax payoffs. If 
anything, the payoffs in the infinite repetition treatment are \\·orsc than the 
10The Equality Solution requires a oue to two rotation scheme, i. e. row plays A once for 
each two times that column plays A. This rotat ion schC'me has a three movP cycle. \Vhat 
is exhibited in tlH' fi g ures is a ten m ove average payoff. Even if a oue to two rotation 
scheme was implemcntccl , t hP t.en move average would not give equal p<~yoffs . Tlowe\'N, 
any one lo two rotatio n scheme' would result in payoffs located on tlw Pardo FrontiN 
and the averaging syste-m used would loca te the outcome within 0.2 payoff points of the 
Equality So lution. No outcomes werf' within these tolerances. 
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payoffs in the finite repetition treatment . 
Figure 1.4 shows the outcomes to G4 . Recall that G4 is idrntical to G 2 
except that a punishment action is added. Unlike in the symmf'tric case, hrre 
the presence of the punishment action changes behavior. In the top diagram, 
the most observed outcome is the Alternating Solution, point (5, 4). This is 
in contrast to the most observed outcome in the finite repetition treatment 
of G2 which was the Nash or Welfare Solution, point (7, 3) . However, a. 
substantial number of outcomes are still inefficient outcomes. The bottom 
diagram has these same fcaturrs : the most observed point is t.hc Alternating 
Solution, and many observations are at inefficient outcomes. Again , drawing 
on the similarity between t,hc top and botLom diagram , infinitr repetition 
did not greatly improve the chancrs of coordinating on an efficient outcome. 
Table 1.5 shows the distribution of oul,comcs over the focal point solu-
t,ions. It is clear that infinite rrpctition makes a difference in tlw symmetric 
treatmrnts it, rrsults in a higlwr percen!,age of dTicient Alternating Solu-
tion outcomes. In the asymnwt ric case, infinit,c repetition docs not seem to 
make a differrnce, the disLribution over the focal solutions remains similar. 
However, the addit ion of a punishment action causes a shift from the 'Wel-
fare Maximizing Solution to t,hr Alternating Solution. In every asymmetric 
treatment, a substantial numbrr of outcomes are not efficient. 
1.5.3 Comparing Average Payoffs 
Table 1.6 shows t,hc average payoffs in the one-shot treatments and in rounds 
5 to V5 of the finite and infinite repetition treatments. In the sym 1net ric 
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treatments, the average payoffs rise as the time horizon lengthens. In the 
one-shot treatment, the average is ncar the payoff associated with the Nash 
Solution, which assigns each player four. In the infinite repetition t reatments, 
the average is near the payoff associated with the Alternating Solution, which 
assigns each player five. Therc seems to be I itt le lost or gained from the 
addition of the punishment action. 
The asymmetric trcatments are much different than the symmetric ones, 
the longer horizons do not imply more efficient group payoffs. In fact, from 
the point of view of the column player, the longer time horizon is disastrous 
- especiall y when the punishrncnt action is p resent.. The avcrage column 
player's payoff drops more than 20 percent when moving from the one-shot 
treatment to either the finite or infinite repetition treatment of (/4 . From the 
group's perspective, this drop in the column player's payoff is not made up 
for by the small incrcasc in the payoffs of the row player. Thc average row 
player only gets around 10 [Wrccnt more when moving from the one-shot lo 
e ither repeated trcatment of G.1. The finite repetition treatmcnt of G2 is the 
only treatment where the players improve upon the payoffs of t hc one-shot 
trcatmcnt. 
1.5.4 The Finite and Infinite Repetition Treatments: 
The Strategy Space 
The followin g definitions diYiclc the strategy sets associated with each repe-
t ition treatment into thrce disjoint parts: 
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Definition 1 (Alternating Strategy) An individual's sequence of play is 
an Altemating Strategy if, for every pe1·iod in the sequence, th e grotlp 's play 
in the previous period was {A,B} or {B ,A}, then individual's play in this 
period is B if last pe1·iod it was A and A if last period it was B. 
Definition 2 (Nash Strategy) An individual's sequence of play is a Nash 
Strategy if for every pe1·iod in the sequence, the individual's play c01·responds 
to the action taken in the highest Pareto ranked, one-shot, subgame perfect 
equilibrium. 
Definition 3 (Other Strategy) An individval's sequence of play 1s rm 
Othe1· Strategy if if, is not an Jlllenwting Strategy or a Nash Strntcgy. 
It is possible to sort every individual 's complete sequence of actions into 
one of the three previous categories. The Alternating Strategy category 
includes all strategies that try to alternate - dire punishment strategies as 
well as completely forgiving st rategies. The Nash Strategy category includes 
only the one strategy.U The Other Strategy category is a. catchall and could 
contain many things, completely random behavior being one example. 
Table 1.7 shows the distribution of strategies for each game's finite repe-
tition treatment. Notice that in the symmetric games G 1 a.ncl G2 , the Alter-
nation Strategy is picked most often. Also there is not a significant diiTerence 
between the distributions, so the punishment act ion makes little diiTcrence. 
11It is possible to have a sequence of plays defined as both an Alternating and a Nash 
Strategy. In the symmetric treatments , if both players choose action 13 in every round , 
each player's strategy will be put int o both categories. Fortunately, no pair of play<'rs 
chooses action 13 in each round , so the problem does not surface. 
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In the asymmetric games G 2 and G4 , there is a significant difference 
between the distribution of strategies with and without the presence of the 
punishment action. The difference exists for both the row and the column 
players. The presence of Other Strategies on the part of the row players in 
G2 shows that there were attempts at alternation - they do not just play 
the Nash Strategy. Most of the column players, however, play the Nash 
Strategy. So, the row players tend to either give up and play the Nash 
Strategy themselves or they punish their partners with the minimax. Most 
of them start playing the Nash Strategy. 
The proportion of players that play an Alternating Strategy in G4 is much 
higher for both types when the the punishment action is present. Note that 
the players never have to use this action, its presence is enough to cause the 
shift. A substantia.! numh<'r of players, both row and column, still pick an 
Other Strategy. 
In fact, in each of the finite' repetition games, a large numl){'r of Other 
Strategies are chosen. Possibk explanations for this is that there is conflict 
between the players, or that they miscoordinate in the early rounds. In any 
case, there is uncertainty during the game about which equilibrium strategy, 
the Alternating Strategy or tlw Nash Strategy, each player is supposed to 
use. 
Another explanation is that there are end-game effects present. With 
end-game effects, players who had been choosing their action according to 
the Alternating Strategy would change to the Nash Strategy before the last 
period. Unlike in G1 and G2 , in G3 and G4 end-game effC'cts would be 
consistent with many subgame perfect equilibria. 
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Table 1.8 reproduces each strategy distribution when the last two peri-
ods of play are ignored.12 There is, in fact, a dramatic end-game effect in 
both symmetric games; 17.5 percent of the subjects switched from Alter-
nating Strategy to Other Strategy in the last two periods of G 1 , 20 percent 
switched in G3 . The data from the asymmetric games, on the other hand, 
show positively no evidence of an end-game effect. One must conclude, tlwn , 
that the Other Strategies present in G2 and G4 are due to conflict or misco-
ordination. 
Table 1.9 shows the distribution of strategies for each game's infinite 
repetition treatment. Notice that in the symmetric games G1 and G2, the 
Alternation Strategy is again picked most often. Also there is not a significant 
difference between the distributions, so the punishment action makes little 
difference. 
The presence of the punishment action also makes little difference in the 
asymmetric games, although there is some shift away from the Nash Strategy 
for the column players. The high number of Other Strategies shows that the 
conflict and miscoordination prcsf'nt in the finite rPpetition trcaJmcnts is still 
there in the infinite repetition t.rPat ments. 
The strong difference between the symmetric !mite and inflnitf' rf'petition 
treatments is not surprising considering the presence of the end-game effects. 
What is surprising is the strong difference between the finite and infinite 
repetition treatments of G2 . There was no end-game effect present in the 
finite treatment of G 2 . 
12Two was chosen because it is the minimum number of reriods that allows both playrrs 
a chance to defect from the Alt-ernate strategy. 
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1.6 Conclusions 
After considering the evidence presented here, it is not unreasonahle to pre-
dict that some groups of people, like the aforementioned Valencian farmers, 
will be able to enter into stable alternation schemes if they are faced with 
situations similar to Reciprocity Games. The farmers are in a symmetric 
situation, 80 percent of the farms are less than 1 hectare. The farmers are 
involved in an infinite repetition conflict, the farms have been there for cen-
turies. Like most of the participants in infinite repetition treatm('nts of G1 
and G3, the farmers have bef'n ahle to institute an efficient rotation scheme. 
In these experiments , it has b('f'n shown that people faced "·ith symmetric 
Reciprocity Games enact solutions which are progressively mor<' efficient as 
the time horizon increases from one-shot to finite repetition to infinite repe-
tition. End-game effects have been found in the finite repetition treatments. 
In symmetric situations, punishmPnt options play very little role. 
The ability of groups of people to obtain efficient outcomes if there are 
large asymmetries between tlwm is much more doubtful. As has been seen, 
there can be a. conflict or miscoordination if the turn-taking a.nd welfare 
maximizing solutions are cliffPrent. Although some succeed in instituting 
one of these t.wo efficient focal outcomes, of those who fail, man~' get non-
individually rational payoffs. Not a single group successfully instituted a one 
to two, or equal payoff, rotation scheme. 
Unlike the symmetric games, pfficiency m the asymmetric games docs 
not tend to increase as the time horizon lengthens. In fact, due to prolonged 
conflict or miscoordination, av('ragc payoffs in the infinite rf'pdition treat-
2.5 
ments are below the average payoffs in the one-shot treatments. \Vith finite 
repetitions, the presence of th<' punishment action causes an incrPase in the 
number of alternation schemes that are successfully implemented or tried , 
although the number of efficient outcomes does not increase signiflcantly and 
the average payoffs fa 11. 
Certainly the results of the examination of the asymmetric games high-
lights problems from a policy standpoint. Common welfare criteria, like the 
Utilitarian criterion (maximize the sum of the payoffs), the Rawlsian cri-
terion (maximize the minimum payoff), Pareto Optimality, or even simple 
rationality are not always achif'vable without intervention. In [act, clearly 
bad outcomes occur frequ<:>ntly. 
And wha.t type of intervention will work? If you care about the sum of 
the payoffs you may choose to shorten the length of the game. Shortening the 
length of the game will c<:>rtainly benefit the group, but the disadvantaged 
will suffer for it. If you care about equality you may choose to endow people 
with the ability to punish, or tax, or fine the other participants. Among the 
efficient outcomes, there will be more egalitarian behavior, but the combined 
benefits of the group will likely fall on average. 
On the other hand , the results of the symmetric games are very encourag-
ing from a policy standpoint. Punishments, taxes or fines ar<' not nf'cessary. 
Simply increase the time horiwn and efficiency rises. 
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1.8 Sample Instructions and Quiz 
The following is a copy of the instructions given in the one-shot treatments 
of G4. 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR A DECISION-MAKING 
EXPERIMENT 
This is an experiment in decision making. You will be paid in cash at the 
end of the experiment. The amount of money you earn will depend upon the 
decisions you make and on the decisions other people make. 'vVe rf'quest that 
you do not talk at all or otlwrwise attempt to communicate with the other 
subjects except according to tlw specifi c rules of the experiment . If you have 
a. question, feel free to raise your hand. One of us will come over to where 
you arc sitting and answer your question in private. 
This experiment has 15 sepa rate rounds and then it will end. During each 
round of the experiment you will be randomly paired with a not her subject. 
You will never be paired with the same subject for two rounds in a row. 
Each round you will be given a. token which will be worth either 4 or 2. 
It will always be worth t lw sanw amount. Each round you will be able to 
use the token in one of three ways: option A, or option B, or option C. 
PAYOFFS 
The amount of money you earn in a. round depends upon which option 
you pick as well as which option your partner picks. WHAT HAPPENS 
29 
IN YOUR GROUP HAS NO EFFECT ON THE PAYOFFS TO 
MEMBERS OF THE OTHER GROUPS AND VICE VERSA. In 




























Your Token Value + 3 points 





l ROWS 1 to 3: If you choose option A you will get 3 points if your 
partner picks either option A or option B. If you choos<"' option A and 
your partner chooses opt ion C, you will get l point. 
2 ROWS 4 to 6: If you choose option B you wi II get your t ok<"'n value 
+ 3 points if your partner picks option A, you will get your token value 
if your partner picks opt ion B, or you wi 11 get 1 point if ~'our partner 
picks option C. 
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3 ROWS 7 to 9 : If you choose option C you will get 1 point if your 
par t ner p icks e ither option A or option B . If you choosC' o pt ion C and 
your partner chooses o pt ion C, you will get 2 points. 
SPECIFIC INSTRUC TIONS: 
At the end of the experiment you wi ll be paid 5 cents for every point you 
have accumulated. 
Quiz 
The following is a copy of t hC' qu iz given in t he one-shot treat mcnts of G4 . 
QUIZ 
id #. --------------------------------------------------
1. If my token is worth 4 points, t he other player in my group will have a 
token value equal to: 
1. 4 points. 
11. 2 points . 
11 1. Either 4 or 2 points. 
tv. None of the above. 
2. If someone was in my group on round 5 of an experim<'nl, it will be 
certain , ve ry like ly, impossible t hat he or she will he in my group 
on round 6. 
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3. If my token value is 2 and I choose option B and my pa rtner chooses 
option A, how many points will I earn? 
4. If I choose option A and my partner chooses option C, how many poin ts 
will I earn? 





Table 1.1: The payoff tables for the four different payoff treatm<'nts: symmet-
ric (Gt), asymmetric (G2), symmetric with punishment (G3 ), and asymmetric 
with punishment (G4 ). 
The Payoff Tables 
G _ [ (3, 3) (3, 7) ] 
TJ- (7,3) (4,1) 
[ 
(3, 3) (3, 7) (1, 1) l 
G3 = (7,3) (4,4) (1, 1) 
(1,1) (1,1) (2,2) 
G _ [ (3, 3) (3, 7) ] 
2
- (.5,3) (2, 1) 
[
(3,3) (3,7) (1,1) ] 
G4 = (.5,3) (2,4) ( 1,1) 
(1,1) (1, 1) (2,2) 
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Table 1.2: The date of each expC'riment along with the numbC'r of subjects, 
the number of observations, the number of periods, the exchange rate, and, if 
there were different treatments in one session, the order of treatmC'nts. 0, F, 
and I stand for one-shot, finite rC'petition, and infinite repetition, r<"spectively. 
Experiments 
game trtmnt date subj. obs. length ~ m·clcr point 
Ct 0 2/4/91 10 75 1 !5 1 
F 1/31/91 LO 20 1.5 4 




G3 0 2/4/91 10 75 1 .5 2 
F 1/14/91 10 20 15 4 
I .5/17/90 12 24 
{20, 41' 4 
26, 25} 
G2 0 2/4/91 10 75 1 .5 3 
F 2/1/91 10 20 15 <I 




c,. 0 2/4/91 10 75 1 .5 4 
F 2/1/91 11 28 1.5 4 
I "1 /20/90 12 24 
{ 16. 29, 
·1 21, 24} 
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Table 1.3: The distribution of outcomes in t he one-shot t reatments. The 
entries in each table represent the number of t imes each outcome was ob-
served in t hat t reatment. The outcomes that satisfy HypothC'sis 4, the Nash 
Solution, have been underlined. Notice that there are no ent.riC's below the 
diagonal in t he symmetric game's G1 and G3 ; the symmetric outcomes are 
classified together. ln the <~symmetric games, a ll outcomes arc classified sep-
arately. 
The Distribution of Outcomes 
One-Shot Treatments 
1 ') ] 
62 
G = [ 6 53 ] 2 0 16 
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Table 1.4: For each One-Shot treatment, the breakdown of individual strat-
egy choices between successes and others for the Nash hypothesis is shown. 
Also shown is the frequency of success and the upper bound of its 95 per-
cent confidence interval. Finally, the distribution of observations under the 
hypothesis when there is no punishment strategy is compared to the distri-
bution of observations when there is a punishment strategy; a x:2 statistic is 
reported. 
One-Shot Contingency Table 
Hyp. 1 Nash Solution 
successes 136 137 59 58 69 7.5 
other 14 13 16 17 6 0 
freq. 0.9066 0.9133 0.7866 0.7733 0.9200 1.000 
high 0.9460 0.9514t 0.8657 0.8541 0.9723t l.OOOt 
x2 / 1 0.0000 0.0000 4.3-103* 
t - significant at a= 0.05 
* - significant by adopted criteria 
high is the upper bound of the 95% c. interval around freq. 
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Table 1..5: For each finite (F) and infinite (I) repetition treatment, the dis-
tribution of outcomes over each focal point solution is shown. 
Distribu t ion of Out comes Over 
Focal Point Solution Concepts: 
G1 G3 G2 04 
F I F I F I F I 
Ilyp . 2 Alternating 3 21 5 19 1 2 8 7 
Hyp. 3 Welfare * * * * 7 8 3 5 
Ilyp. 4 Equality * * * * 0 0 0 0 
JTyp. 1 Nash .5 0 1 0 *"' *"' "'* ** 
Other 12 3 14 5 12 14 17 12 
* - Ily p. is the sam e as Alternating 
** - Ilyp. is the same as Welfa re 
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Table 1.6: The average payoffs in the one-shot treatment and in rounds 5 -
15 of the finite and infinite repetition treatments. 
Average Payoffs 
One-Shot Finite Infinite 
Gt G3 Gt G3 Gt G3 
player 4.147 4.027 4.535 4.58.5 4.908 4.8.50 
group 8.294 8.0.54 9.070 9.170 9.816 9.700 
One-Shot Finite Infinite 
G2 G4 G2 G4 G2 G4 
row 2. 78.5 2.725 2.955 3.021 2.896 3.029 
col 6.0·10 6.160 6.175 4.757 5.638 4.821 
group 8.825 8.88.5 9.130 7.778 8.534 7.8.50 
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Table 1.7: In each Finite Repetition treatment, the distribution of strategy 
choices is shown. The distribution of strategies when there is no punishment 
strat<'gy is compared to the distribution of strategies when th<'re is a. punish-
ment strategy; a. y 2 statistic is rC'porkd. 
Finite Rcp<'l it ion Contingency Table 
ROW COL 
Gt G3 02 G4 G2 G4 
Alt. 21 23 0 11 4 10 
Nash 6 4 2 2 1.5 4 
Other 13 13 18 15 1 14 
y~ 0.-1009 10.2234* 19.4124* 
* - sign ifi cant at a= O.O.S 
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Table 1.8: The different strategy distributions over the focal solutions ob-
tained when all periods are taken into account and also when all but the last 




All Periods and All But the Last 2 Periods: 
G1 G3 
all periods all periods - 2 all periods all periods - 2 
Alt. 21 28 23 30 
Nash 6 6 4 .5 
Other 13 6 1:3 .) 
Row Players 
G2 G4 
all periods all p<>riods - 2 all periods all periods - 2 
Alt. 0 0 11 11 
Nash 2 2 2 2 
Other 18 18 15 15 
Column PlayPrs 
G2 G4 
all periods all periods - 2 all periods all periods - 2 
Alt. 4 4 10 10 
Nash 15 15 4 .5 
Other 1 1 14 13 
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Table 1.9: In each Infinite Repetition treatment, the distribution of strat-
egy choices is shown. The distribution of strategies when there is no punish-
ment strategy is compared to the distribution of strategies when there is a. 
punishment strategy; a. x2 statistic is reported. 
Infini te Repetition Contingency Table 
ROW COL 
G1 G3 G2 G4 G2 G4 
Alt. 42 40 6 6 2 7 
Nash 2 1 6 4 12 6 
Other 4 7 12 14 10 11 
y~ 1.2003 0 . .5538 4.8254 
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Chapter 2 
A Bounded Rationality, 
Evolutionary Model for 
Behavior in Two Person 
Reciprocity Games 
2.1 Population Games and the Replicator 
D y namic 
Due to the Folk Theorem, a gen<'ric infinitely repeated game has many equi-
libria. The multitude of equilibria is a problem for theorists bC'cause a jus-
tifiable and non-arbitrary method of eliminating the majority of the equi-
libria has not been found. In t hC' last chapter, experimental evic!C'nce was 
presented tha.t suggested that p layers in infinitely repeated , symmetric reci-
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procity games usually succeed in establishing a pattern of alternation. The 
player's actions have given a clue as to which of the equilibria should remain 
after elimination. In this chapter a method which eliminates most of the 
experimentally unobserved equi libria is given. 
The m ethod is based on a mathematical model of evolution, developed in 
biology, called the Replicator Dy namic. The Replicator Dyna mic supposes 
a large population of players, each endowed with a particular strategy. Each 
player in the population lives (plays a game), creates offspring identical to 
itself, and then dies. The mixture of player types within the population 
changes from generation to generation as the population grows and depends 
upon the success that each playC'r has in creating offspring. In the Replicator 
Dynamic, each player begets a number of offspring that is proportional to 
that player's lifetime fitn ess, or payoff. The result is that later generations 
have a. higher proportion of players endowed with high payoff strategies. 
Suppose that the initial population has every possible st ratC'gy repre-
sented in it. Then, if the Replicator Dynamic is ever in equilibrium , meaning 
that the mixture of player types rC'mains the sam e from generation to gener-
ation, the strategies that remain in the equilibrium have been justified in a 
Darwinistic sense. 
The problem with the Repli ca tor Dynamic is creating an initia l popula-
tion with every possible strategy in it. In the case of an infinitely repeated 
game, there are infinitely many possible strategies making it necessary to 
have a population of infinite si?:e. The analysis of the dynamics on such a. 
population are beyond the sta te of the art . For any analysis to succeed , there 
must be only a finite number of possible strategies. It is impossible, then, 
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without further assumptions, to use the Replicator Dynamic as a method 
of justification. Here, it will be assumed that players have a. finite memory. 
This bounded mtionality constmint uniformly limits the number of possible 
strategies. 
Application of the model to the infinitely repeated, symmetric reciprocity 
game succeeds in ihe sense that there is only one possible equilibrium. The 
equilibrium encompasses the exchange of favors a.s well as a. behavior asso-
ciated with short run payoff maximization and a. behavior which could be 
coined as irrational (although none of the players are rational in any sense). 
All of these behaviors are seen in the experiments reported in the previous 
chapter. It is not a complete success, however, because the behaviors are not 
seen in the same ratios and furthf'rmore, the irrational behavior is not an 
equilibrium in the standard sense. 
These types of population games have been studied before, perhaps the 
best known examples are the papers by Axelrod (1979) and Axelrod and 
Hamilton (1981) which reported on Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. tourna-
ments. In these tournaments, various people, most of them professional 
scientists, submitted computer programs which were, in essence, strategies 
in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. Together, the programs made an artifi-
cial population which competed by playing a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. in 
round robin fashion. After competing each strategy was reproduced based on 
their relative scores, the higher a strategy's score, the higher that strategy's 
representation in latter generations. They found that the strategy tit-for-tat 
displaced the other submitted strategies. 
A variety of papers focusing on the dynamics of the tournaments followed. 
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Blad (1986), Hirshleifer and Martinez Coil (1988), Mueller (1987) and Young 
and Foster (1991) use Replicator Dynamics to justify or determine equilib-
ria in three-strategy Prisoner's Dilemma and perturbed Prisoner's Dilemma. 
games. The strategies considered were: All Defect, All Cooperate, and some 
variant of tit-for-tat (grim for example) . The cooperative outcome was an 
equilibrium in almost all settings in these works. Smale (1980) applied the 
Replicator Dynamics to a sett ing where players only remembered a summary 
of the past (an average of their past payoffs). He found that if the players 
play good strategies, then cooperation is a globally stable equilibrium. 
A different approach was taken by Miller (1989) who used an optimization 
technique called the Genetic Algorithm. A Genetic Algorithm takes a. subset 
of the possible strategies as a population. The possible strategies, in turn, are 
determined by the computing power available. The population then evolves 
much like populations under the Rf'plicator Dynamic. The cliff<'rence is that 
each member of the population faces a probability of random mutation (be it 
gene specific or crossover) before or after the next generation is formed. Miller 
found that " ... cooperative strategies ... tend to proliferate throughout the 
population under [certain conditions]." 1 
One criticism of these lines of research is that all of them apply their 
dynamic models to subsets of the possible available strategies. Furthermore, 
the subsets are determined in relatively arbitrary ways. In the three strategy 
dynamic models, for example, no reason is given for considering tit-for-tat 
while not considering, at the same time, the grim strategy. 2 This criticism 
1Miller (1989), p. 12. 
2 Mucller (1987) attempts an argument by showing that he considers as a third strategy 
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becomes more powerful when the works of Boyd and Lorberbaum (1987) and 
Nachbar (1989) are taken into account. Boyd and Lorberbaum showed that, 
contrary to previous optimistic research, no pure strategy is evolutionarily 
stable in the infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. This finding depends 
upon the fact that all possible strategies have a chance of being played. 
Nachbar showed that the limit of the Replicator Dynamic in a two-stage 
Prisoner's Dilemma has everybody defecting (although All Ddcct is not the 
only strategy in the limit). 
One way to uniformly limit the number of strategies under consideration 
in an infinitely repeated setting is to apply a bounded rationality constraint. 
The constraint is a logical one to consider given the comments of Aumann 
and Sorin (1989) who write: 
The first hint that bounded recall might have something to do 
with cooperation came in the summer of 1978. Aumann and 
Kurz, with the help of Jonathan Cave ... worked out a version of 
the infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with memory one; this 
means that each player can base his action only on what !tis op-
ponent did at the previous stage - he has "forgotten" everything 
else. This results in an 8 x 8 hi-matrix game; iterated removal 
of weakly dominated strategies yields a unique strategy pair, in 
which both players start by playing "friendly" and continue with 
"tit-for-tat" thereafter. The outcome is cooperative, both players 
the strategy that in some sense punishes optimally. 
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always playing "friendly." 3 
However, Aumann and Sorin is not a paper concerned with population dy-
namics, and so it proceeds down a different path. 
The effects of a one period recall will be considered here, only the payoff 
structure will not be that of a Prisoner's Dilemma. Instead , the analysis 
will focus on the Reciprocity Game. This paper is, in a sense, an answer 
to Rapoport (1988) who laments about the " ... persistent hegemony of Pris-
oner's Dilemma ... " and claims that " ... it is evident that there is enough 
to do in this area [of 2 x 2 ganws] for an army of investigators."4 
2.2 The Environment 
Let G be a symmetric, two-person, strategic game with finite action spaces 
Ai = Aj = {a, b} and payoff matrix 
where the top row and first column correspond with the choicP of action 
a and the bottom row and second column with action b. Let G00 be the 
supergame made up of an infinite sequence of plays of game G. 
A history or memory of length k for player i is defined as hf E IT~=I Aj. 
Notice that under this definition, player i only has a memory of the last k 
3 Aumann and Sorin (1989), p. 9. 
4 Rapoport (1988) , pp. 400 - 401. 
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actions of player j; player i does not remember his own actions. Let sk E 
Sk : hk ~---+ A (with subscripts suppressed) be a function that maps a player's 
memory into an action. Call sk a strategy with a bounded memory of length 
k and let Sk c s= be the set of all k length strategies. Let sa = S 1 • 
Another way to think of the set sa is as the set of strategies which can 
be implemented by a two-state automaton, such automatons are commonly 
called Moore machines. A Moore machine, here from player i's point of view, 
consists of a quadruple, {H, q0 , j, >.};,where, 
1. H is a finite set of histories or states, 
2. qo is an initial state, 
3. f: H x Aj ~---+ His a transition function, and 
4. >. : H 1---t A; is a behavior function. 
In this particular case, it is convenient to suppress Hand f and explicitly 
enumerate >.. This should cause no confusion because H = {a, b} and f 
maps Aj directly into H, i.e . .f(a) =a and f(b) =b. This convent ion allows 
a machine to be written as a triple, for example {a, a, a}, where the first 
represents qo the initial move of the machine, the second represents >.(a) , 
the move that the machine chooses if its opponent chooses action a., and the 
third represents >.(b), the action chosen if its opponent chooses action b. The 
machine {a, a , a} plays action 'a' on the first move, and then plays action 'a' 
regardless of the action its opponent chooses. There are eight possible two 
stage machines with these characteristics and they correspond directly with 
the strategies in the set S8 . Number the eight machines as in Table 2.1. 
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Suppose that two players, who are limited to choosing strategies in 8 8 
or equivalently to choosing one of the eight machines, meet and play c=. 
Because of the finite strategies, the sequence of play eventually cycles, with 
the longest cycle being four stages. For example, if player i chooses machine 
ss = {a, a, b} and player j chooses machine s8 = { b, b, a}, then the sequence 
of plays will be {(a, b), (b, b), (b, a), (a, a), (a, b), (b, b), ... }, with the first of 
each pair in the sequence being player i's move. Player i's sequenc<:> of payoffs 
will be {,8,')',7],a,,B,/, ... }; the payoffs will also cycle. Define the function 
1r : 5 8 x 5 8 f-+ ~ as player i's average cycle payoff. For this example, 
1 
1r(ss, ss) = -(,8 + 1 + 1] +a). 
4 
As an alternative example, consider the payoff if player i had chosen s 1 
and player j had chosen s2 • In this case, the sequence of play will be {(a, b), 
(a, a), (a, a), ... }. After the first. stage, the machines play (a, a) forever. The 
average cycle payoff to player i is, 
The application of the bounded rationality constraint and the particular 
definition of the payoff functions has transformed the infinitely repeated game 
c= into a single period game with an 8 X 8 payoff matrix, II. rr is shown in 
Table 2.2 
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2.3 The Replicator 
The following notation is inspired by Taylor and Jonker (1978). Consider a 
population of N risk-neutral, payoff maximizing players who interact in ran-
domly matched pairs. Let n; be the number of players who choose strategy i. 
The population can then be represented as a point p in the eight-dimensional 
simplex~. with p; = n;j N and :L:f=t p; = 1. 
Assume that there is exponential growth or decay. Specifically, ~ = r;ni , 
where r; is the current growth rate for n;. Growth in the population follows 
d:: = f N, where f is the average growth rate. 
By differentiating Pi = N, 
l ~ dN c Pi __s}J__ _ n i dt 
dt N N2 
N N 
Pi( 1'; - f) . 
Now, assume that the growth rate of players with strategy i is equivalent 
to the expected payoff, or fitnf'ss, of player i. In other words, F(ilp) = 
:L:f=t Pt1r(s;, sl), which is the exp<"ctecl payoff of player i, is equivalent tor;. 
Similarly, F(plp) = :L:?=t p;F(ilp) , which is the expected payoff of a. random 
member of the population, is equivalent to f. Then by substitution , 
dp · d; = p;[F(ilp)- F(plp)]. (2.1) 
Now, ~ is the instantaneous change in the proportion of players using 
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strategy i. Note that ~ > 0 if and only if F(iJp) > F(pJp), and ~ < 0 
if and only if F(iJp) < F(pJp). Hence, the proportion of players using 
strategy irises (or falls ) with time only if the expected payoff of strategy i is 
greater than (or less than) the expected payoff of a random member of the 
population. If the expected payoff to strategy i is the same as thC' expect<'d 
payoff to a random member of the population, then ~ = 0. 
Equation 2.1 implies a dynamic in continuous time on the simplex 6.. 
Given an initial state or initial population in 6., the dynamic describes a 
particular trajectory. 
Assumption 1 Every initial pop1tlation is a point p located in th e inte1·ior 
of the simple:r 6.. 
The assumption means that <'Very possible strategy has at least some 
representation in the population. 
Definition 1 An equilibrium is any population p such tlwt !ljt = 0 for all 
t. 
Definition 2 Given an eq1tilib1'ivm p , p is asymptotically stable if a 
frajeci01'Y that passes thro11gh p' converges to p with lime, for all p' in an 
open neighborhood a1'0tmd p . 
Definition 3 Given an eq1tilibrium p , p is globally asymptotically sta-
ble if a tmjecfo1'Y that passes lll1'01tgh p' converges top with lim e. jo1· all p' 
in the inte1·io1' of 6.. 
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Playing a random member of a population p is like playing against a 
mixed strategy q where p = q. A particular mixed strategy will be clenot<'d 
q; and will be treated in the obvious way by the function F. 
Assumption 2 The payoff matrix, M, is such that 1J > '1~ .6 > 1 > 
max{,B, a}. 
The assumption means action a is strictly payoff dominated by action b 
and assures that in what follows x E (1/2, 1). Furthermore, the assumption 
defines the properties necessary for the game to be a symmetric Reciprocity 
Game. 
Now, which strategies are of interest in a Reciprocity game? The strate-
gies s 1 and s 2 always play a, which is a dominatC'd strategy in the game G. 
The strategies s3 and s 4 always play action b, which is the dominant strategy 
in the game G. There are three ways alternation can occur: if a player with 
strategy s 5 meets a player with strategy s6 , or if two players with strategies 
S7 or s8 meet. Only the first of these ways is consistent with the idea of 
reciprocation. 
Define the point q e = pe = [0, 0, 0, 0, x, (1- :r ), 0, 0], with :r such that the 
following equali ty holds: 
If the population is at point p e, then the only strategies present are strategi<'s 
ss and s6. 
Lemma 1 The point p e 1s an rq7tilibrium. 
Proof: This is true since, 
implies ~ = 0 for all i . 
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f3 +7J 
xa + (1- x)-
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So, an equilibrium with both s5 and s6 players present exists. In this 
equi librium, every t ime an s 5 player meets and s6 player, there will be Alter-
nation. Of course, meetings bctwc<'n s 5 a nd s6 p layers are not th<' only types 
of meetings that occur. When an 5 6 player m eets anot her 5 6 playPr, the se-
quence of play is{ ... , (b, b), ... }. At each stage, the players myopicly choose 
t he Dominant Strategy Nash equi librium. It is also an subgame-perfect Nash 
equilibrium in the game G00 , although every other equilibrium has Pareto 
Superior payoffs. The last type of meeting which could occur is between two 
5 5 players. In this case, the sequence of play is { . . . ,(a,a), . . . } which is not 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium play; it wi ll be called Irrational. 
Lemma 2 The equilibrium p e is locally asymptotically stable. 
Proof: By Lemma 1 p e is an eq uilibrium. In equ ilibrium, the expected payoff 
to a random member is x !1-;fJ + (1- x )!. Suppose point p' is an element of an 
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open neighborhood around pe. If the trajectory through p' converges with 
time to pe then pe is locally asymptotically stable. 
Two conditions must be meet for the trajectory to converge to pe. First, 
no strategy with positive weight at point p' can have a higher fitness when 
playing qe, the equilibrium mixed strategy, than qe itself. 
Second, if any strategy happens to do equally as well as qe, then it must 
be the case that that strategy is in the support of qe and qe must do better 
when playing q' than q' itself, where q' is the mixed strategy associated with 
the point p'. 
Formally, 
• For all Pi> 0, F(s;lpe) :::=; F(qelpe) and, 
• if F(s;lpe) = F(qeiPe), thPn qi > 0 and F(s;lp') < F(qelp'). 
The fact that these two conditions are sufficient for asymptotic stability 
is due to Taylor and Jonker (1 978). 
Note that it is enough to consider only pure strategies with positive weight 
because any mixed strategy will have a payoff that is a linear combination of 
the payoffs to pure strategies. If all the pure strategies satisfy the previous 
two conditions, then any mixed strategy will as well. 
The payoffs of all strategies that might have positive weight in a disturbed 
state against the equilibrium strategy are: 
• F(1, pe) = F(2, p e) = :ra + (1- x)a =a 
• F(3, pe) = F( 4, p e) =X/+ (1 -X )t = / 
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None of these strategies does better against qe than qe itself. Both s 5 and 
s6 do equally as well, however, so how these strategies do against themselves 
and how qe does against them must also be considered. 
• F(qe,5) = F(qe, 6) =X~+ (1- x)! 
• F(5, 5) =a 
• F(6,6)= r 
Because the payoff to qe is higher than the payoff to strat egy s.s wh<'n 
both play against s 5 and because it.s payoff is higher than the payoff to s6 
when both play s6 , and because no other strategy does as well agai nst i t as 
itself, the equilibrium is loca lly stable . 
0 
lienee the equilibrium p e is resistant to small shocks or invasion by small 
numbers of players with a diffNent strategy. But what if there is a large 
shock or if there are large numbNs of players with other strat<'gies in the 
initial population? To determine what happens in these cases, the following 
two lemmas will be used.5 
5 T he two Lemmas show that it is possible to iterativ<> ly eliminate strictly dominated 
stra tegies in this case. A genera l theorem encompassing this result can be fo und in Samuel-
son and Zhang (1992). 
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Lemma 3 Given Si and si such that F(i,p) < F(j,p) for all p E ~~and 
any p 0 in the inte1·ior of~' limt-+oo Pi = 0. 
Proof: First , note that because p; and Pi are m ~' E.!. is bounded below 
PJ 
by 0. Because of this, it is enough to show that limt-+oo Ei = 0. Time is 
PJ 
continuous and runs from 0 to oo. Consider an infinite sequence of points in 
time {t1, t2, ... , tn, .. . }, such that tn > tn-l· Given any initial population, 
it is possible to determine the values of Pi and Pi at any point tn · Define a 
second sequence by Tn = p,(tn). 
PJ { tn) 
Now, to show that the sequence of Tns is monotonicly decreasing, it JS 
sufficient to show that 
~ ~ 
which implies that .J~.L < ->~.L. 
p, PJ 

















Because the sequence Tn is monotonicly decreasing and boundcd below by 
0, it must converge, and because it converges, limt-+oo Ei must also converge. 
PJ 
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Suppose the limit converges to a point x greater than zero. Then, at point 
~ ~ 
x, ....d.L = ..JJL. This implies that F(ilp) = F(jlp) which is a contradiction. 
Pi P1 
So, the limit point must be 0. 
D 
Lemma 4 Consider population p with Pk < c;, stmtegies St and q such that 
F( lli) ::; F( qli) for all i f- k and F( lli) < F( qli) for at least one i f- k. If 
c; is small enough so that F(llp) < F(qlp) and if Pk is never bigge1' than c;, 
then for p 0 in the interior of 6. , limt-oo PI = 0. 
Proof: First, note that because p1 and q are in 6., L PI . is bounded below 
ilq;>O p, 
by 0. Because of this, it is enough to show that limt-oo L PI = 0. Time is 
•iq,>O p, 
continuous and runs from 0 to oo. Consider an infinite sequence of points in 
time {t1,i2,·· .,tn,·· .}, such that tn > tn-l· Given any initial population, it 
is possible to determine the values of PI and Lilq,>oPi at any point tn. Define 




Now, to show that the seq uen ce of Tns is monotonicly decreasing, it is 
sufficient to show that 
dpt/ Lilq;>O Pi = ( "" . dpl - . "" dp; )/( "" ·)2 0 
dt ~ p, it p, ~ lt ~ p, < 
ijq,>O C ilq,>O G ilq,>O 
~ L: ~ 
which implies that ....d.L < rlq,>o dt 
PI Lrlq, >O p, 
Because F(llp) < F(qlp), 
[F(llp)- F(plp )] 






Because the sequence Tn is monotonicly decreasing and bounded below 
by 0, it must converge, and because it converges, limt.-oo 2: PI must also 
iJq;>O p, 
converge. 
Suppose the limi t converg<"'s to a point x greater than ZNO. Then, at 
• ~ I:ijq >O * Tl . . l' h F(li ) F( I ) 1. I . powt x, _......_ = • . 11s 1mp 1es t at p = q p w 11c 1 I S a 
PI l:.Jq;>O p, 
contradiction. So, the limit point must be 0. 
0 
And now, the main result: 
Theorem 1 The eq11ilib·ri1tm p e is globally asymptotically stable. 
Proof: The strategy s4 strictly dominates the strategies s1 and s2, F(s,dp) > 
F(siiP) and F(s41P) > F(s21P) for all pin~ . By Lemma3, P1 and P2 go 
monotonicly to zero as t goes to infinity. In particular, for any small positive 
number c, at some point in time, p 1 and p2 will both be less then c. 
Now, either s4 or q e strictly dominates s7 with regard to all strategies 
except s 1 and s2. If 
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then qe is strictly dominant. If the inequality does not hold, then clearly, 
implying that s4 is strictly dominant . 
Because the inequalities above are strict, it is possible to pick an E: small 
enough so that if the weights of the strategies s1 and s 2 are less than .::, 
either F(s41P) > F(s71P) or F(qelp) > F(s4 ip). Lemma 4 then implies that 
P1 goes to zero as t goes to infinity. 
Similarly, Lemma 4 can be usc>d to show that Ps and then P3 and P4 go 
to zero as t goes to infinity; each time q e is the mixed strategy nceded in the 
Lemma. 
We are now left with only two pure strategies that can have weight greater 
than.::, ss and s6. Suppose Ps is very small , then F(ssiP) = ((3 + ry)/2 + 81 
and F(s61P) = 1 + 82, for some 81 and 82 small. If Ps is small , then Ps 
will grow with time. What if p5 is large? Then F(ssiP) = a + 81 and 
F(s61P) = (f3+ry)/2+82, for some 81 and 82 small. If Psis large, then Ps will 
decay with time. 
In any case, the trajectory through any initial point must eventually come 
within any neighborhood of p e, and by Lemma 2 converge tope. 
0 
No matter what the initial population is (as long as it is in the interior 
of~), the Rcplicator Dynamic will converge to an equilibrium with only s 5 
and s6 players. In this equilibrium there will be three types of sequences of 
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play: Alternation, Dominant Strategy Nash, and Irrational. 
2.3.1 Other Symmetric Garnes 
What types of problems occur if Assumption 2 is not met? Well, suppose 
a > /, which covers the case of the Prisoner's Dilemma. Then there is no 
strategy that strictly dominates another. While p e is still an equilibrium, it 
is not a globally asymptotically stable equilibrium. The same result occurs 
if f3 > /, or if f3 > 'f/; these cases cover the game of Chicken. A numerical 
example encompassing both of these alternatives will be given later. 
Recall Aumann and Sorin 's application of a one period recall to the in-
finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. Aumann and Sorin justify their result 
by the elimination of strategies based on weak dominance alone. Unfortu-
nately, under the Replicator Dynamic weak dominance alonc is not enough 
to assure that a particular strategy's representation in the population goes 
to zero. While Nachbar (1988) does prove a theorem which gives positive 
convergence results in a subset of weakly dominant solvable games, his result 
cannot be applied in Aumann and Sorin's example. The difficulties encoun-
tered in weakly dominant solvable games are covered well in Nachbar (1988) 
and interested readers are refcrred there. 
2.3.2 Asymmetric Garnes 
There are inherent similarities between the Battle of the Sexes and Reci-
procity Games which might lead you to believe that a similnr result could 
be obtained in the Battle of the Sexes. There is a problem, howcver - the 
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Battle of the Sexes is an asymmetric game. There are two approaches in the 
modeling of asymmetric games as population games: analyze two distinct 
populations, and make the game symmetric through random population as-
signment. 
Analyzing two distinct populations changes the dynamics dramatically. 
Consider what would happen in the case of the Reciprocity Game. Call the 
two populations the row population, rp, and the column population, cp. Let 
them evolve in the obvious way. Then the populations such that rp = cp = 
p " would still be an equilibri um , but instead of being an global attra.ctor, it 
would be a repeller. Any small ckviation leading to a higher number of ss 
row players, for example, will cause the dynamics to flow towards populations 
consisting entirely of s 5 row players and s6 column players. There are many 
other equ ilibria possible, each depending upon the initial populations. A 
global result is impossible. 
Suppose that the game is mad<' symmetric. The obvious way of accom-
plishing the task is to randomly choose one of each pair of players to be the 
row player and to let the otlwr bet he column player. A player's payoff would 
be their average payoff gotten as a row player plus their average payoff gotten 
as a column player divided by two. Alternatively, each player would face a 
payoff matrix consisting of cells which were the average payoff across both 
types given those actions. Specifically, suppose 
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and 
where Me was the payoff matrix faced by column players and Mr was the 
payoff faced by row players. Then the payoff matrix faced by a player in the 
version of this game played with random population assignment would be: 
M = 2 2 . 
[ 
~ f3c + f3r l 
!Zd!l!:. ~ 
2 2 
This method is an improvement over the two population method because it 
does not change the outcome predicted in the Reciprocity Game. In fact, 
any asymmetric game that mf'ets Assumption 2 after having been made 
symmetric will meet all the assumptions required by Theorem 1. 
Unfortunately, even with random population assignment, the Dattle of 
the Sexes does not meet Assumption 2. 
2.4 Examples 
Consider the payoff matrix 1111 , 
Then Theorem 1 holds with :r = 1/3. Figure 2.1 shows a phase portrait for 
the initial generation that has all strategies with equal representation in the 
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population. 
In equilibrium, there are only three possible outcomes to a meeting be-
tween two players, call them: Alternation, Dominant Strategy Nash Play, 
and Irrational Play. Alternation occurs whenever a player with strategy 85 
meets a player with strategy 8 6 . The sequence of play in this case would 
be {(a, b), (b, a), (a, b) , ... }. Alternation occurs with probability 4/9. Dom-
inant Strategy Nash Play occurs whenever a player with strategy 8 6 meets 
another player with strategy s6 . The sequence of play in this case would 
be {(b,b),(b,b),(b,b), .. . }. Dominant Strategy Nash play occurs with prob-
ability 4/9. Irrational Play occurs whenever a player with strategy 8 5 meets 
another player with strategy 8 5 . The sequence of play in this case would he 
{(a,a),(a,a),(a,a), ... }. The probability of this outcome is 1/9. 
As an example of what happens if the payoff matrix is not constructed 
with the correct inequalities, consider the payoff matrix M 2 , 
In this case, Theorem 1 does not hold. Figure 2.2 shows a phase portrait for 
the initial generation that has all strategies with equal representation in the 
population. Figure 2.3 shows a phase portrait for a different initial genera-
tion. Notice that the equilibria are different for these two initial generations. 
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2 .5 Conclusion 
It has been shown that a large class of two-player, hi-matrix games, both 
symmetric and asymmetric, have a unique equilibrium when they are mod-
eled as population games containing players with bounded recall. The class 
is the set of all games which meet Assumption 2. In the unique equilibrium, 
both trading favors and short term maximization occur. A third irrational 
outcome also occurs. Normative justification for all three of these behaviors 
can be obtained from the Darwinistic maxim claiming that only the fittest 
should survive. 
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81 : {a, a, a} 82 : {b,a ,a} 
83 : {a,b,b} 84 : { b, b, b} 
8s : {a,a , b} 86 : {b,a,b} 
87 : {a,b,a} 8g : { b, b, a} 
Table 2.1: The eight machines or strategi<>s contained in S 8 . 
74 
0 0 (3 (3 ()' 0 (3 (3 
0 0 (3 (3 0' 0 (3 (3 
1J 1J I I I I 1] 1J 
1J 1J I I I I 1J 1J 
IT = 0 0 I I ()' 
!3+'1 c.+/3+'1+'1 a+i3+YJ+'Y 
2 4 4 




2 4 4 
1J 1J (3 (3 
cY+/3+!1+'1 a+/3+'7+1: a+-y (3 
4 4 2 
1J 1J (3 (3 
<Y+i3+YJ+'Y o+P+YJ+'Y 1] -y+a 
4 4 
-2-




Phase Portrait for Example 
0.9 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------
Generation (in 1 Os) 
--- AA- _ BB-*- AAB 
-e- BAB -M- ABA__...._ B BA 
Figure 2.1: The phase portra it for payoff matrix !111 . The term _ AA stands 
for the sum of the representation of s1 and s2 , _ BB is similar. The initial 
generation has all strategies equally represented in the population. 
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Phase Portrait for Counter-Example 
Initial Generation A 
1 ~----------------------------------------------. 
0.9 ·············-----·-·······-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Generations (in 1 Os) 
---- AA- _ 88------ AA8 
-a- 8A8 -M- A 8A __.__ 8 8A 
Figure 2.2: The phase portrait for payoff matrix !lh. The term _ AA stands 
for the sum of the represent at ion of s 1 and s 2 , _ BB is sim ilar. The initia l 
generation has all strategies <'qually represented in the population. 
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Phase Portrait for Counter-Example 
Initial Generation B 
0.9 ............................................................................................................... . 
-~ 0.8 ················································································································ 
ro "3 0.7 ............................................................................................................ . 
a. fr. 0.6 ................. ······························································································ 
.!: 0.5 .............. ································································································· 
c: 
0 04 .......... ···································································································· t . 
§.0.3 
n: 0.2 ---------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------
0.1 
0~~~~~~~~~-.~~ .. ~~~~ .. ~~~~ 
Generations (in 1 Os) 
--- AA- _ BB---- AAB 
-e- B AB -M- A BA ......_.. B BA 
Figure 2.3: The phase portrait for pa.yoff ma.trix 1112 . The term _ AA sta.nds 
for the sum of the representation of s 1 a.nd s2 , _ BB is similar. The initial 
generation is p 0 = [0.048, 0.0~8, 0.078, 0.078, 0.264, 0.282, 0.182, 0.020]. 
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Chapter 3 
Anomalous Behavior in Linear 
Public Goods Experiments: 
How Much and Why? 
3.1 Introduction 
1 There is a. growing body of data. obtained from experiments on voluntary 
contributions in linear public goods environments with a single publi c good 
a.nd a. single private good. Many features of the data have been difficult to 
explain; for example, subjects violate dominant strategies on a regular ba-
sis. They give a.way money, apparently just to be nice (Isaac and Walker 
[1984, and elsewhere]) ; at least as often , they seem to give away money just 
to be mean (Saijo and Yamaguchi [1992]). Furthermore, individual behavior 
1T his chapter contains work that is joint with T homas Palfrey. 
80 
over time exhibits erratic patterns, it alternates back and forth between ex-
treme generosity and extreme selfishness. Ledyard's (1992) excell<"nt surv<"y 
documents these and several other anomalies. 
These anomalies might be cause for alarm as they signal trouble for any 
but the most schizophrenic models of behavior. However, the range of en-
viornments for which these experimental results have been reported is very 
narrow, and the designs employed make it difficult if not impossible to iden-
tify decision rules at an individual level. The point of this paper is to broaden 
the playing field in a natural direction , using a design that permits estima-
tion of individual behavior. By changing both the information structure and 
the distribution of preferences , this design also provides a robustness check 
on the anomalous findings of past experiments. 
We offer the following thought experiment in the context of a well-studied 
private goods allocation mechanism, the second-price auction, in hopes that 
it will help the reader understand some of our concerns about design, and to 
foreshadow what follows. 
A Thought Experiment: 
Imagine conducting a Sf'cond-price sealed bid auction experiment 
with four players, where each is told to bid for an obj('ct that 
is worth exactly $1.58 to him. After careful explanation of the 
rules, ten identical, sealed bid, second-price auctions are t lwn 
conducted in sequence. Bids are required to be greater than or 
equal to 0 and less than $1..58 and ties are broken randomly. After 
each auction, subjects are told the winning bid and the second 
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highest bid. When the tenth auction is over, everyone is paid by 
the experimenter and thanked for showing up. 
What do you think the distribution of bids will be, and how will 
this distribution change from period to period? How wou ld you 
plan to bid in such an auction? 
The first observation to be made about the thought experiment is that 
it shares some of the traits of many voluntary contribution, public goods 
experiments that have been reported in the literature. In the most common 
voluntary contribution, public goods experiment , like in the thought experi-
ment, there are a number of identical players. Also, the players are asked to 
make a decision about buying a good and they are given personal incentives 
not to buy it, or at least to spend as little as possible on it. Much of what is 
known about free riding is based on experiments with this typf' of design. 
The second observation to be made is that little can be learned a bout the 
general bidding behavior of the participants. In the auction, each player at-
taches the same value to the good in each of the ten auctions. Furthermore, 
every other player also attaches this same value to the good. The measure-
ment of a gem•ral bidding function is practically impossible; the best one can 
do is estimate behavior at a particular point. 
It would be possible, by running a number of experiments and varymg 
the value of the good, to construct something that looked like a bidding 
function. However, that function would depend upon the fact that every 
player attaclws the same value to the auctioned good. This function would 
only measure how an individual's choice behavior changes wlwn their own 
82 
value and the joint dist?·ibution of all bidders' values change simultaneously. 
The estimated function would have other limitations as well- to obtain the 
data required , an individual would have to participate in a large number 
of 10-auction sequences. The amount of play necessary might lead to a 
confounding of the effects of bidding behavior and of experience, unless a 
large number of experiments were conducted. 
A final observation is that, in spite of the fact that there is a dominant 
strategy equilibrium where each bids $1.57, one can, for a variety of reasons, 
imagine players bidding differently. In fact, it is difficult to guess what might 
actually happen, especia lly if Lhe players are inexperienced.2 
It should be no surprise to learn that audion experiments arc not usually 
conducted like Lhe thought experiment. Auction experiments have focusrd 
exclusively on different environments, environments in which players have 
diverse preferences and di verse information. These are the environments in 
which auctions most naturally occur. What is surprising is that voluntary 
contribution f'Xperiments have, for the most part, not shared Lhis focus. 3 
This paper, and the experimental design it employs, is motivated by our 
20ne might a lso notice that the thought experiment is a repeated game not a one-shot 
game. We do not address this potential complication until later in the paper. 
3 There are a few exceptions , notahly Fisher et a!. 1991 and Isaac et a!. 1985, both 
of which consider environments with two types. The former provides subjects with iden-
tical information a bout other subjects' preferences as in parallel homogeneous preference 
experiments. The latter has several other different features, including nonlineariti es, and 
does not conduct any baseline experiments with homogeneous preference. nrookshire et 
a!. (1991), Smith (1980) , and Manvel! and Ames (1980) a lso have conducted experiments 
with heterogeneous preferences, but these are not comparable for other reasons. None of 
these experiments varied individual subject preferences across decisions , nor did they pro-
vide explicit information about the dis tribution of preferences in the population. Palfrey 
and Rosenthal (1991) use an environment similar to the one expla ined here, but the public 
good technology is step- level, not linea r. 
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reflections about the thought experiment, and by a view that much can be 
gained by shifting the research agenda in the direction of this different class of 
environments. One benefit is simply better measurement: response (bidding) 
functions can be estimated at the individual level. Also, we can check for 
the robustness of existing results to environments that include features, such 
as heterogeneity of preferences, that are endemic to natural settings. In 
what follows , we report results from our experiments that study this kind of 
environment, and we contrast these results with previous findings. 
3.2 Background 
This paper investigates contribu tion behavior under the Voluntary Contribu-
tion Mechanism in simple linear public good environments where all players 
have dominant strategies. The typical environment consists of N individuals, 
each endowed with X ; discrete units of a private good. The marginal rate of 
transformation between the public good, y, and the private good is one-for-
one, and individual utility functions are of the form: U(y, x;) = Vy + rix;. 
We refer to V as the value of the public good, and it is normalized to be the 
same for all individuals. 
The Voluntary Contribution Mechanism defines a simple game, in which 
each individual simultaneously decides how much public good (between 0 and 
X;) to produce on his own. Total public good production in the economy is 
the sum of all private production of the public good. Payoff functions are 
then defined from the final allocation and the utility functions in the obvious 
way. This game is repeated several times. 
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As pointed out in Section 1, much of what we think we know about 
behavior in this game is based on experiments in which X; and r; are the same 
across individuals and repetitions and r;JV > 1. This paper concentrates on 
a group size of four. 
Several findings have emerged from these other investigations: (1) nearly 
all players in this game violate their one-shot dominant strategy, with many 
contributing upwards of half their endowment, even when r;/V is three or 
more; (2) there is a strong negative relationship between the marginal rate of 
substitution r;/V and the rate at which violations are observed; (3) roughly 
half the aggregate private endowment is contributed by inexperienced sub-
jects on the first play of the game; (4) violations of dominant strategies 
diminish with repetition and with experience (playing a second sequence of 
games with a new group); (.5) viol at ions of dominant strategies to contribu te 
(rJV; < 1, Saijo and Yamaguchi [1992]) appear to be even more prevalent 
than violations of dominant st rat egies to free ride. 
3.3 Our Design and Procedures 
Our experiment looks at the above findings more closely by studying envi-
ronments with both non-degenerate distributions of r;/V, and with private 
information. These innovations are introduced to overcome the limitations 
of past designs , limitations suggested by the thought experiment. The inno-
vations permit us to measure rc>sponsiveness to 1·;/V, via response or bidding 
functions, at both the individual level and the aggregate level, and to mea-
sure a baseline> of deviant or erroneous behavior clue to nuisance factors , such 
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as boredom or confusion. 
There are a number of specific features of our design that enable us to 
address other issues that are relevant to understanding other commonly ob-
served patterns of behavior. These features are listed below. A sample copy 
of the instructions is in the Appendix. 
1. In all our environments, subjects receive r;'s that are randomly assigned 
according to a uniform distribution between 1 and 20. vVe sometimes 
refer to these as token values. Each time a subject is to make a new 
decision, he is independently and randomly assigned a new r; for that 
decision. Subjects do not know the other subjects' assignments of rj 's, 
but the distribution is publicly announced at the beginning. The value 
of V is also announced at the beginning. 
Therefore, the data contain multiple observations of the choice behavior 
of each individual, observations at different levels of r;jV, and permits 
the estimation of response functions at both the individual and aggre-
gate levels. 
2. We vary the distribution of marginal rates of substitution, (1·;/V), 
by shifting V. We look at the four different distributions given by 
V E {3, 6, 10, 15}. One of the distributions, V = 3, has the feature 
that group efficiency is not maximized when all subjects contribute in 
every round. In that condition, on average, forty percent of the time 
subjects are assigned a tok<>n value that is worth more than four times 
the individual marginal value of the public good. In these cases, con-
tribution reduces group efficiency. 
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3. We vary the endowment. In one condition, everyone is cndowed with 
one indivisible unit of the private good. In the other condition everyone 
is endowed with nine discrete units. 
4. Each subject makes a sequence of ten decisions in a fixed group with 
three other players. This allows a direct comparison to some past 
experiments, notably those reported in the Isaac and Walker studies. 
5. Each subject participates in a total of four sequences, each time with 
a different group of subjccts. The first two sequences have the same 
parameters; the last two sequences have the same paramctcrs (but dif-
ferent from the first two). This allows us to identify experience effects. 
All four sequences occur in a single session that lasts approximately q 
hours. Each session incluclcs sixteen subjects. 
6. All sessions were conducted at the Caltech Laboratory for Experimental 
Economics and Political Science, using a collection of PC's that are 
linked together in a network. 
7. Each subject was paid cash, based on a session-specific exchange rate, 
for each point they carncd in the session. The exchange rate was picked 
so that the sum of equilibrium payoffs was approximately the same 
across sessions. 
[Table 1 here] 
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3 .4 Response Functions and Background 
Noise 
We focus mainly on two aspects of the data. The first has to do with at-
tempting to identify what we call ermrs or background noise- behavior that 
is grossly inconsistent with standard theory. Second, we attempt to measure 
response functions, which are the analog to bidding functions in auctions. 
The functions answer the question: How do contribution decisions depend 
on the marginal rate of substitution? We measure errors and response func-
tions at both the aggregate and individua.l levels, using nonparametric and 
parametric models of the error structure. 
It is useful to think of our analysis in the context of a random utility 
model, of the sort found in Maddala (1983), McFadden (1982), and elsewhere, 
for the analysis of data with limited dependent variables. For example, in the 
condition where subjects have a single indivisible unit of the private good, 
they face a simple binary decision. We model the statistical structure of 
residuals by assuming that ut ility functions have a random component that 
is not observed. For lack of a better name, we call this the alh·uism (or 
warm glow) term. Depending upon the value of the altruism term, subjects 
may receive some additional utility from contributing a unit of their endow-
ment , over and above the utility induced by the payment method used in the 
experiment. 
Theoretically, an optimal response function for an individual with an 
additive warm glow term , c:;, is to contribute X; if r;jV < 1 + c:; , and to 
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contribute 0 if r;/V > 1 + c:;. Any behavior is optimal when r;/V = 1 + c;. 
This is what we call a ctdpoint strategy (Palfrey and Rosenthal [1988]). In 
fact, this optimal strategy is a one-shot dominant strategy for any values of 
c;, r;, V, and X;. 
If the value of c; is stochastic, and vanes according to some assumed 
distribution, an estimated response function gives the probability of contri-
bution as a function of other controlled variables, such as experience, etc. 
In addition, the response function gives us indirectly an estimate of "back-
ground noise." We look a.t the effect of the following variables on response 
functions: 
• The induced marginal rate of substitution (r;fV). 
• Experience. 
• Endowment (divisible or indivisible - i.e. one or nine units). 
• The value of the public good (V). 
• Repetition (Is there a decay over the ten rounds of play?). 
3.5 Analysis of the data 
3.5.1 Some baselines 
We present three different bas<'line error rates. This gives a rough calibration 
of a lower bound on the amount of background noise4 in the experiment. By 
4 Contemporaneous work by Andreoni (1992) is also pursuing this issue. 
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this, we mean the percent of observed decisions that appear incongruous with 
nearly any currently accepted theory of rational decisionmaking. We also 
make an attempt to compare our baseline with baselines observed elsewhere, 
to the extent possible. 
Splitting 
By splitting, we mean that a subject contributes some fraction of his endow-
ment, but not all of it. Because of the linear structure of the environment , 
such behavior is not rational even if a subject has a warm glow term added 
to his marginal rate of substitution. While it might be possible to think up 
models where such behavior is rational, such explanations would likely be 
quite contri ved . Tables 2, 3, and 4 present the splitting data from our ex-
periments. Recall that in half of our experiments, subjects were not capable 
of splitting, since they had only a binary choice. Thus, the data in this table 
is based on only half the sample. One can see t wo striking features. First, 
splitting is more prominent among inexperienced subjects and in the early 
periods of each 10-period game. Second, splitting almost never occurs when 
subjects have r;fV < 1. In other words, a lmost all splitting ca n be accounted 
for by subjects who have a dom inant strategy to free ride. 
[Table 2, Table 3, and Table 4 here] 
These findings contrast sharply with those of Issac and Walker. They 
observe splitting well over half of t he time in their data. and, for their marginal 
rate of substitution , or MRS, of 1.33 experiments, there is very little decay 
of splitting over the course of the ten periods. 
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[Table 5 here] 
Spiteful behavior 
Many have speculated that subjects violate their dominant strategy to free 
ride because of some form of altruism, or alternatively, because their utility 
function depends on group payoffs in a positive way. If this is the main 
driving force behind the past findings, then we should see very little free 
riding when subjects have r;jV < 1. Based on this scenario, violations of 
dominant strategies to contribut<" can reasonably be attributed to effectively 
random behavior. This gives us a second kind of baseline error rate. In our 
experiments, four percent of the decisions violate the dominant strategy to 
contribute when 1·;/V < 1. This number is remarkably stable across periods 
and across the experience treatmPnt (see Table 6). 
[Table 6 here] 
Sacrificial behavior 
In one of our designs, V = 3, thC' group optimum is not obtained by everyone 
contributing for every possible r; they might draw. In particular, the group 
payoff is maximized if subjects contribute if and only if r; ~ 4 V = 12. A 
subject who contributes when 7'; > 12 sacrifices more than the <>ntire group 
benefits. It is hard to imagine any except the most fervent altru ists contribut-
ing under these circumstances. The frequency of this type of contribution 
also provides, in a slightly different wa.y, a lower bound on the amount of 
91 
"crazy" or random behavior. As Table 7 shows, this kind of behavior is ap-
proximately as common as spiteful behavior, but virtually disappears with 
experience (1 observation out of 129). 
3.5.2 
[Table 7 here] 
Estimation of response functions from aggre-
gate data 
A Simple Model 
We measure response functions as the probability of contribution as a func-
tion of the marginal rate of substitution or MRS. First, consider the following 
family of theories, a family that includes both the dominant strategy (gam<") 
theory and the altruism theori<'s based on an additive warm glow altruism 
term. Each member of this family is characterized by an error rate, c:, and a 
threshold , 1\1 . An (c:, 1\;J) theory states that "Individuals contribute to a pub-
lic good if and only if the marginal rate of substitution (token value divided 
by public good value plus warm glow) is less than or equal to !If . However, 
they make errors at a rate of c: ." 
If M = 1, then this is just the dominant strategy theory, modified appro-
priately to account for the possibility of error. If M > 1 this indicates some 
degree of altruism, everyone is altruistic. If M < 1, this indicates negative al-
truism. According to our data., what is the best theory in this family? Using 
the criterion of maximum likelihood, the answer is theM* that produces the 
fewest classification errors in the data, together with c:* equal to whatever 
92 
the classification error generated by M* is. This is not only easy to calculate, 
it is also easy to illustrate graphically. Figure 1 displays the answer: In our 
data, the best theory isM= 1.1. It results in only 12.5 percent (c*) classifi-
cation errors and is very close to the selfish cutpoint equal to 1.0. Figures 2 
and 3 break this analysis down across the various levels of the ll-treatment 
and the two levels of the endowment treatment. 
Probit Analysis 
An alternative, more fami liar way to estimate response functions is by Probit 
analysis. In effect, the Probit analysis fits curves through the raw data shown 
in Figures 4-7. In this analysis, we assume that an altruism term, cit, is a 
Normally distributed random term added to an individual's MRS that it is 
independently distributed across individuals and across decisions. 
The impact of experience, endowment and other experimental treatments 
are easily assessed by introducing dummy variables. The simplest probit 
model, with only a constant term and ri/V, or MRS, entering on the right 
hand side gives us an estimate oft he average altruism term, which we denote 
by t, and its standard deviation r7<. 
We consider five Probit l\1odels which are built by recursiYely adding 
independent variables to the basic model. Note that an observation in these 
models is a. decision involving a single token. In order to maintain equa l 
representation between the conditions with an endowment of one and those 
with an endowment of nine, an investment decision in the endowment of one 
cond itions is given the same Wf'ight as nine similar investmf'nt ckcisions in 
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the endowment of nine conditions. 
The intercept coefficients in a Probit model represent changes in €/CT., and 
the slope coefficients represent changes in -1/CT,. The estimated mean , €, is 
equal to minus the slope coefficient divided by the intercept coefficient. It 
follows that a. negative change in the already negative slope coefficient leads 
to a. decrease in €, holding everything else constant. This decr<>ase is implied 
by the decrease in variance due to the more negative slope coefficient. If 
everything is to stay the same, t must also decrease. The decrease in variance 
also makes the slope of the curve steeper. 
From each Probi t Model , WC' ca n obtain a response function P(- ), which 
returns the probability that a subject invests in the public good. The six 
variables in the other models ar<>: exper.s, a. slop<> dummy for subjects with 
experience; exper, a consta nt dummy for subjects with experienc<> ; endow.s, a. 
slope dummy for treatments with an endowment of nine; endow, a constant 
dummy for subjects with an endowment of nine; V, the marginal return 
from the public good; and period which ranges from 1 to 10. Coefficients, 
t-sta.tistics, log likelihoods, and the percentages correctly predicted for each 
model are given in Table 8. 
[Table 8 here] 
Turning to specific models, even the simple model P1 , in which a player's 
investment dC'cision depends only upon MRS , is able to correct ly predict 
83.064 percent of the observations. 
In model P 2 , the slope coemcient for the experience variable, exper.s, 1s 
negative which means the response curve for experienced subj<'cts is st eep<>r 
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than the response curve for inexperienced subjects. The coefficient for the 
intercept variable for experience, exper, is positive. This tends to offset the 
change in t implied by the reduced variance, however, the total change in t 
is still negative. 
A player's cutpoint is the point at which he is indifferent between investing 
in the public good and investing in the private good, the point where 'Pi = 
1/2. For inexperienced subjects, the estimated cutpoint is 1.641 , and for 
experienced subjects, it is 1.399. This finding reinforces the findings of Isaac 
and Walker. Experienced subjf'cts are more consistent with the dominant 
strategy model than inexperien ced subjects. In this case, the effect is even 
significant. Of independent int<>rest is that experienced subjects' response 
functions are sleepeT, indicating less random behavior. 
Probit model 'P3 , shows a minor effect of the addition of a pair of Pn-
dowment varia hies, both equal 1 if the endowment is nine tokens and 0 if 
the endowment is one token. Tn this case, the slope shift is positive and the 
intercept shift is negative. The consequence is that the response fun ction for 
subjects in the high endowment condition is flatter than the response fun c-
tion for subj ects in the low endowment condition. The negative intercept is 
enough to counteract the highf'r variance, however , and the high endowment 
m eans are lPss than the low endowment m eans. The magnitudes of these 
coefficients are much smaller than those associated with the experience ef-
fect and the e ffect of the endowment change is similarly smaller. 5 The actual 
differen ces ar<' shown in Figure 8. 
5The m agnitudes are comparable because the variables, both dummies, are of the same 
scale , namely 0 or 1. 
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The variable V, which is added in model P4 , measures the marginal val-
uation of the public good. One interpretation (since we have controlled for 
MRS) is that its coefficient tells us what happens to a subject's behavior as 
the payoffs rise. Although the effect is very small, we find that a player's re-
sponse function becomes steeper, and the average deviation becomes smaller. 
A similarly small result holds when the period of the decision is taken into 
account. Holding everything else constant, a player is less likely to contribute 
in later periods than in earlier periods. 
Quite clearly, the major effects are clue to MRS and experience. \\' hile the 
endowment condition has some effect, it is not as important. The effects clue 
to the size of the payoffs and to the period of the decision pale in comparison. 
3.5.3 Response Functions and Errors: Individual 
Level Analysis 
The analysis in the previous section assumes that individuals are identical. 
In fact, there are indications of heterogeneity in our data. Similar indications 
have also been noted in past work. This section offers a simple approach to 
look at differences between individuals, based on minimization of classifica-
tion errors (as in section 5.2.1). We do two things. First , we break down tha.t 
analysis by individual, and obtain a distribution of classification minimizing 
cutpoints for individuals. This allows us to identify the fraction of subjects 
who behave consistently with the Nash equi librium, subjects we call Nash 
players. Second , from these estimated individual cutpoints, we can obtain a 
distribution of the error rates across individuals. This gives us a way to iden-
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tify what fraction of subjects are behaving consistently with some cutpoint 
model. 
We define a Nash Player as a player who is rational and non-a.ltruistic.6 
That is €; = 0. With this in mind, consider Tables 7 and 8 which report, 
by subject, the raw number of classification errors for each of the twenty 
possible cutpoints. These cutpoints correspond to the possible token values. 
They are the only applicable cutpoints, because they relate directly to every 
possible realization of r;. 
[Tables 7 and 8 here] 
Each possible cutpoint is given a score based on how well it represents 
that subject's decisions in the exp<"riment. The score is simply the number of 
times a. violation would have occurred if that was the actual cutpoint rule the 
subject used. 7 More specifically, we hypothesize that a particular player is 
using a cupoint that corresponds to token value x (we consider <"very possible 
x in turn). Hypothetically, each time that play<"r receives a token valuer;, 
he compares it to x and then spends only if r; < x. A classification error 
occurs if one of the two following events occurs: 7'; < x and the player does 
not spend, or 7'; > x and the player does spend. The lower tlw cutpoint's 
score, the better it represents that person's decisions. In tltcse two tables 
we report the data from one of the {6,1} treatmf'nts and one of the {6,9} 
6 Because our estimation allows for errors, a Nash Player may be diffe rent than a player 
who perfeclly follows the decision rule implied by the self-interested model. The difference 
is that a Na.<>h Player is allowed to make mistakes. 
7 When a particular rule was imprecise, i.e., when the player was indifferent, it was 
assumed that no errors were made. 
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treatments.8 
The first thing to notice is that the minimum error cutpoint is not always 
unique. When forced to estimate a unique cutpoint, we select the one closest 
to 1, which is Nash play. In Table 9, subjects { 4, 6, 10, 14, 15, 16} are classified 
as Nash players, as are subjects {3,4,5,6,8, 10,12, 13,15} in Table 10. A 
second thing to notice is that not every subject has the sa.me estimated 
cutpoint. In Table 9, for example, subject #2 has an estimated cutpoint 
of 2.17 (corresponding to a token value of 13) while subject #16 has an 
estimated cutpoint of 1.0 (corresponding to a token value of 6). Another 
observation is that, for some subjects, the minimum number of errors is 
strictly greater than zero. 
Pooling across all experirrwnts, we find that 144/256, or 56 percent of 
the observations are Nash players. The entire distribution of cutpoints is 
illustrated in Figure 9. On tlw :r-axis is the difference between the estimated 
cutpoint and the value of the public good in tok('n value units. For example, 
subject #1 from Table 10 would be included in the "3" category in this figure, 
since his estimated cutpoint is 9 and the value of the public good is 6. An 
x-value of 0 in this figure corresponds to Nash play. This figure can also he 
broken down by experience, and doing so illustrates the effect of ('Xperience 
on inducing Nash (non-altruistic) play. This is shown in Figure 10. 
Finally, we define consistent players as players that can be perfectly clas-
sified, so that they never make an error at their estimated cutpoint. Pooling 
across all experiments, we find ] 78/256, or 70 percent consistent players. The 
8These two tables are meant to be representative. 
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percentages of experienced and inexperienced consistent players are 75 and 
64 respectively. Figure 11 displays the distribution of error rates, measured 
as the proportion of an individual's decisions that are inconsistent with his 
estimated cutpoint. Comparing to the earlier baselines, these error rates are 
again mostly in a range of five percent or below. 
3 .5.4 Comparison to Previous R esults 
There are a few simple comparisons between our data and the data from 
four person experiments conducted by Isaac and Walker. Recall that, in 
Issac and ' ',Talker's experiments, all subjects have identical marginal rates of 
substitution , equal to either 1.33 or 3.33 (which they refer to as High MPCR 
and Low MPCR). Their experiments also used a ten-period repetition design. 
The most notable difference between their data and ours is in the fre-
quency with which we observed consistent Nash play. This occurs when a 
subject, for an entire ten-period rC'petition, makes no decision that is incon-
sistent with dominant strategy Nash equilibrium. In terms of Figures 9 and 
11, these subjects are in the 0-categories in both figures . vVe observe this 
118 out of 2.56 observations, or 45 percent of the time. Isaac and vValker 
observe this 7 out of 76 observations, or 9 percent of the time. Thus we find 
five times as much consistent Nash play. Large differences also occur in the 
frequency of splitting, as pointed out earlier (Tables 2- 5). 
A second comparison is to look a.t the decisions made by our subjects 
when they had MRS = 1.33 and MRS = 3.33. The comparison is given in 
Table 11 . 
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[Table 11 here] 
Again, the same kind of pattern emerges. We find lower contribution 
rates. In fact, our contribution rate for MRS = 3.33 is roughly the same 
magnitude as the background noise measured in our baselines. 
A third comparison is what we call repetition effects and what has been 
referred to elsewhere as decay - it is typical in these experiments to see less 
contribution in later periods than in early periods. In fact, in comparable 
experiments, contribution rates in early periods have ranged from two to four 
times as much as contribution rates in later periods. 'vVe measure an effect in 
our data (recall the Probit analysis), but we find the magnitude of the decay 
to be very small. It is true that there is more free riding in later periods, 
but this is attributable to a decrease in subject errors, or an increase in their 
consistency, not to a change in their decision rule. This fact is also reflected 
in the decline of splitting behavior documented earlier. 
Andreoni (1988) conducted experiments similar to those of Isaac and 
Walker and observed magnitudes of contribution, free riding, and decay that 
by interpolation are roughly the same as those found in the data gener-
ated by Isaac and Walker. Those experiments used five person groups and 
MRS = 2. Instructions were somewhat different and some new treatments 
were explored. Andreoni's result.s are similar to those of Issac and Walker, 
and differences between our data and his are likewise similar to the differences 
between our data and Issac and Walker's. 
Our findings also contrast sharply with the highly anomalous behavior 
In the experiments done by Saijo and Yamaguchi. They conducted homo-
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geneous preference experiments with MRS = .7 and MRS = 1.42. Like 
Andreoni, they observe magnitudes of free riding, and decay for their exper-
iments with an MRS = 1.42 that are roughly the same as those in Isaac and 
Walker's data. Saijo and Yamaguchi and Issac and Walker also observe simi-
lar split rates. The splitting rates observed in both of Sa.ijo and Yamaguchi's 
treatments are 55 percent. They get as much splitting when subjects have a. 
dominant strategy to contribute, a.s when subjects have a. dominant strategy 
to free ride! Our findings are dmmatically different. 
Saijo and Yamaguchi obsC'rve aggregate contribution rates that are dif-
ferent from ours and also from Isaac and Walker's. For the 1.42 treatment, 
they observe 27 percent contribution, which is quite a bit less contribution 
than that seen in Isaac and vValker's data. for MRS = 1.33. Our closest ob-
servations to MRS = 1.42 are at l\fRS = 1.5 and MRS = 1.4. We obserwd 
contribution rates of .27 and .36, respectively for those two values of MRS. 
In their MRS = .7 treatment, Saijo and Yamaguchi see a contribution 
rate of 58 percent! Recall that our observed contribution rate was so close 
to 1 (.96) for this range of MRS, that we used this as one of our baselines for 
the rate of background noise! We have no satisfactory explanation for this 
enormous diffE'rE'nce between their results and ours. However, we do note 
that those experiments were conducted somewhat differently in a number of 
ways, which may partially account for the differences in data. 
Saijo and Yamaguchi employed seven member groups instE'ad of four 
member groups, they conducted the experiments manually instE'ad of through 
a. computer network, and they used different instruction methods. In fact , 
they used two instruction sets as a. treatment, and found significant differ-
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ences due to that treatment. Also, they required subjects to make each 
decision within 20 seconds, and they used a different subject pool. Saijo 
and Yamaguchi suggest that the differences may be attributable to cultural 
d ifferences between Japan and the U.S. We are skeptical of that explanation, 
but have no better one to offer. 
3.6 Interpreting the Results 
The main differences between our findings and previous findings can be sum-
marized by the following observations: 
1. We observe less splitting. 
2. We do not observe significant decay. 
3. We observe lower contribution rates. 
4. We observe more Nash behavior. 
5. 'vVe observe essentially no spiteful behavior. 
The findings that replicate from past experiments with comparable group 
sizes are that experience leads to lower contribution rates, and contribution 
rates are declining in the marginal rate of substitution (margina l valuation 
of the private good). 
Explanations for the differences that we observe are either methodological 
or environmental in nature. Possible methodological explanations abound: 
we uti lize slightly different experimental procedures, or our instruct ions and 
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computer screens are different, we employ a different subject pool, etc. On 
the environmental side, our experiments utilize a different economic envi-
ronment, by which we mean the information structure and the profile of 
preferences in the group are different. In particular, as emphasized in the 
introduction, the information structure and profile of preferences correspond 
almost exactly to the standard environment used for auction experiments. 
In each period, preferences in the group are randomly and independently 
drawn from a known distribution of marginal rates of substitution, thereby 
inducing heterogeneity across individuals. This contrasts sharply with envi-
ronments that have been explored in earlier investigations of the voluntary 
contributions mechanism. 
To try to assess the relative importance of the methodological and en-
vironmental explanations, we have subsequently tried to replicate Issac and 
Walker's findings using our procedures and subject pool and their homoge-
neous environment. Specifically, we conducted an additional experimental 
session where every subject had a. publicly announced marginal rate of sub-
stitution equal to 3.33, and every subject was endowed with multiple units 
of the private good. 
Figure 12 compares the results of this sessiOn with the data from Issac 
and Walker. There is very little difference. The main features of the data 
replicate: there arc very high contribution rates early on, and these rates 
decay significantly. In this extra session, we also observed similar splitting 
rates and amounts of Nash lwha.vior. Based on this data., we dismiss the 
possibility that differences in our experimental procedures or subject pool 
are responsible for the differences in our results. 
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Thus we are left only with environmental explanations. This leads us to 
conclude that the findings from earlier experiments, experiments that utilized 
homogeneous environments, are not robust to public goods environments 
which exh ibit variation in preferences, even if we limit attention only to 
linear public goods environments. This is a significant finding, even more so 
if one suspects, as we do, that heterogeneous preferences are a fa.ctor in most 
natural settings. There is an interesting question left open, namely "Why 
does heterogeneity lead to such different results?" 
It is possible that, with homogeneous preferences, it is easier for a. group 
to achieve a cooperative solution of the sort suggested by repeated game argu-
ments. For example, if subjects adopt the type of strategies that rf'ciprocate 
generous behavior by others, or lw ] ieve that others adopt these strategies (see 
Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, and Wilson [1985]), then some of thf' patterns of 
behavior that have been noticed in the homogeneous preference experiments, 
decay and pulsing, for example, can be rationalized. 
In our design, since preferences are private information , the ability to 
signal one's generosity to other players is interfered with.9 If one is observed 
to contribute, other subjects cannot tell if you are being generous, or simply 
acting selfishly. 
To identify the effects of tlw private information in our experiments, we 
conducted two revealed-information sessions (with V = 6 and X= 9) where 
all token value draws were revf'aled to everyone in the group. In the first of 
9 Actually, in most of the homogen<>ous design experiments, homogeneity is not. publicly 
announced. However , experiments by Isaac and Walker (1990) find that common knowl-
edge of the homogeneity has no effect on behavior. They conjecture that subjects infer 
from the wording in the instructions that. other subjects have simi lar payoff tables. 
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these sessions, token values we re revealed after the decisions were made. In 
the second, token values we re revealed before the decisions were made. In 
both cases, the signal interference problem is eliminated, which, if the above 
explanation is correct, should lead to greater contribution and less free riding. 
The pooled results for the revealed information sessions are displayed in 
Figure 13, which compares the empirical response function with t he data from 
all the other heterogeneous preference experiments (those with no revealed 
information) .10 There is very little difference. In fact , if anything, revealed 
information seems to lead to even more free riding behavior, which is contrary 
to the reputation hypothesis . 
This leaves us without a complete explanation for why we observe such 
different resul ts in our environment. At this point , we simply do not know. 
A number of other possible explanations can be imagined. Perhaps it was 
important (because of faster lea rning, less boredom, or something else) that 
subjects in our design are assigned a new MRS for each decision. This sort of 
explanation unfort unately seems to be currently beyond the reach of existing 
theoretical models of behavior in these kinds of ga.mes. On the other han d , 
the findings here are suggestive of possible new directions for theoretical 
work , as well a.s some directions for new experimental designs. 
10There is no significant difference between the two revealed information sessions, so 
pooling the data is reasonable. 
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3.8 Sample Instructions 
Decis ion-Making Expe riment 
This is an experiment in decision making. You will be paid IN CASH at the 
end of the experiment. The amount of money you earn will depend upon the 
decisions you make and on the decisions other people make. It is important 
that you do not talk at all or otherwise attempt to communicate with the 
other subjects except according to the specific rules of the experiment. If 
you have a question, feel free to raise your hand. One of us will come over 
to where you are sitting and answer your question in private. 
This session you are participating in is broken clown into a sequence of 
four separate experiments. Each experiment will last 10 rounds. At the 
end of the last experiment , you will be paid t he total amount you have 
accumulated during the course of all 4 experiments. Everyone will be paid in 
private and you are under no obligation to tell others how much you earned. 
Your earnings are given in FRANCS. At the end of the last expe riment, you 
will be paid 11 cents for every 100 FRANCS you have accumulatf'cl during 
the course of a ll 4 experiments . 
In each experiment you will be divided into 4 groups of 4 persons each. 
Those groups will stay the same for all 10 rounds of the experiment. After 
each of the 10 round experiment s, everyone will be regrouped into 4 entire ly 
new groups. Therefore, whenever we change groups, the other people in your 
group will be completely different from the last g roup you were in. You will 
not be told the ident ity of the other members in your group. Since we will 
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be running 4 experiments tonight, you will be assigned 4 different groupings, 
one for each 10 round experiment. 
RULES FOR EXPERIMENT #1 
Each round of the experiment you will have 9 tokens. You must choose how 
many of these tokens you wish to keep and how many tokens you wish to 
spend. The amount of money you earn in a round depends on how many 
tokens you keep, how many tokens you spend, and how many tokens are 
spent by others in your group. Each round, you will be told how many 
FRANCS each token is worth if you keep it. This amount, called your TO-
KEN VALUE, will change from round to round and will vary from person to 
person randomly. To be more specific, in each round, this amount is equally 
likely to be anywhere from 1 to 20 FRANCS. There is absolutely no system-
atic or intentional pattern to your token values or the token values of anyone 
else. The determination of token values across rounds and across people is 
entirely random. Therefore, everyone in your group will generally have dif-
ferent token values. Furthermore, these token values will change from round 
to round in a random way. You will be informed PRIVATELY what your 
new token value is at the beginning of each round and you are not permitted 
to tell anyone what this amount is. 
After being told your token value, you must wait at least 10 seconds 
before making your decision of how many tokens to spend and how many to 
keep. Your keyboard will be frozen for this period of time. When everyone 
has made a decision, you are told how many tokens were spent in your group 
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and what your earn ings were for that round. This will continue for 10 rounds. 
Following each round you begin with 9 new tokens and arc randomly assigned 
a new token value between 1 and 20 FRANCS. 
PAYOFFS 
You will receive 6 FRANCS times the total number of tokens spent in your 
group. In addition, you will a lso receive your token value times the num-
ber of tokens you keep. Notice that this means every time anyone in your 
group spends a. token, ev<'ryon<' in the group (including the spender) gets an 
additional 6 FRANCS, but the spender foregoes his or her tok<'n value for 
that token. WHAT HAPPENS IN YOUR GROUP HAS NO EFFECT ON 
THE PAYOFFS TO J\1El\1DERS OF THE OTHER GROUPS AND VICE 
VERSA. Therefore, in each round, you have the following possibl<' earnings, 
as shown in the table: 
[HAND OUT EARNINGS TADLE. ALSO WRITE ON BOARD] 
Suppose everyone else in your group spends 13 tokens in all and you spend 
4 tokens and your token value was 12. You would earn 24 + 78 + 60 = 162 
FRANCS. If you had spent 3 tok<'ns you would have earned 18 + 78 + 72 = 
168 FRANCS. If you had spent 5 tokens you would have earn<'d 30 + 78 + 
48 = 156 FRANCS. 
ADDITION AL PROCEDURES: 
1. Are there any quest ions? [ANSWER QUESTIONS] 
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2. Hand out quiz. 
3. Correct quiz answers and read them aloud. 
4. Answer any additional questions. 
5. Two practice rounds - Tell them not to press any keys unless you tell 
them to. In round 1 have a ll even ID#'s spend and odd keep. In round 
2 do it the other way. Go over screen display and history. Tell subjects 
to refrain from pressing keys for no reason. 
Specific instructions for Experiment 2: 
Experiment 2 is the same as experiment 1 except you now have been re-
grouped with a completely different set of people. 
Specific instructions for Experiment 3: 
Experiment 3 is the same as experments 1 and 2 except now everyone In 
a group receives 10 FRANCS Limes the number of spenders in the group. 
Again, in addition, nonspenders a lso receive their token values. Remember 
that everyone has been reassignPd to a group with a new set of people. Here 
is your new payoff table: 
[HAND OUT NEW EARNINGS TABLE, AND COLLECT OLD ONE. 
CHANGE BOARD. EXPLA IN.] 
Suppose everyone else in you r group spends 13 tokens in all and you spend 
4 tokens and your token value was 12. You would earn 40 + 130 + 60 = 230 
FRANCS. If you had spent 3 tokens you would have earned 30 + 130 + 72 
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= 232 FRANCS. If you had spent 5 tokens you would have earned 50 + 130 
+ 48 = 228 FRANCS. 
Specific instructions for Experiment 4: 






Endowment 3 6 10 15 
1 token 2 2 2 2 
9 tokens 2 2 2 2 
Table 3.1: Each cell has two 10-period sequences of a. cohort with sixteen sub-
jects divided into four groups. The first sequence is called "in<:>xperienced"; 
the second is called "experienced." Groups were shuffled betwe<:>n sequences. 
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early late 
mexp. .22 .11 
(320) (320) 
exp. .12 .04 
(320) (320) 
Table 3.2: Analysis of Splits. All data with endowment nine. 
early late 
1nexp. .36 .19 
(182) (176) 
exp. .21 .07 
(180) (170) 
Table 3.3: Analysis of Splits. Endowment = 9, MRS > 1. 
early late 
mexp. .029 .021 
(138) (144) 
exp. .021 .0067 
(140) (1.50) 






MRS = 1.33 MRS= 3.33 




Table 3.5: Splitting behavior in the Isaac and Walker data. 
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early late 
mexp. .03 .04 
(262) (28.5) 
exp. .04 .04 
(263) (288) 
Table 3.6: Spiteful behavior. Free-riding rates for subjects with ~1RS < 1 
(Dominant Strategy to Contribute) 
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early late 
111exp. .08 .04 
(63) (65) 
cxp. 0 .002 
(65) (64) 




1 2 3 4 5 
ones 1.778 1.504 1.612 1.801 1.850 
(85.301) (57.596) ( 45.538) (34.252) (32.222) 
MRS -1.156 -0.916 -0.973 -1.013 -1.015 
(-86.358) ( -58.866) (-44.078) (-42.878) (-42.896) 
exper.s -0 .861 -0.858 -0.867 -0.868 
( -25.252) (-25.084) ( -25.235) ( -25.233) 
exper 0.983 0.980 0.992 0.994 
(20.013) (19.919) (20.075) (20.089) 
endow.s 0.104 0.108 0.107 
(3. 742) (3.888) (3.8.56) 
endow -0.199 -0.207 -0.20.5 
( -4.618) (-4.761) ( -4 . 730) 
v -0.015 -0.015 
( -4.923) (-4 .993) 
period -0.008 
(-2.146) 
lg lkhd -8912.7 -8522.7 -8511.9 -8499.7 -8<197 .4 
% pred. 83.064 83.160 83.238 83.429 83.607 
Table 3.8: In each Probit Model, the dependent variable is the investmC'nt 
decision. Equal weight has been given to both the one token treatment and to 
the nine token treatment. Under each coefficient is the asymptotic t-statistic. 
The log likelihood and the percentage correctly predicted arC' also given for 
each model. 
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Token Value (Cutpoint) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 91011121314151617181920 
1 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 4 4 5 
2 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 5 
s 3 5 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 2 3 3 3 3 3 4 
u 4 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 3 3 4 5 5 5 5 
b 5 4 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 
J 6 2 2 2 2 1 0 0 0 1 2 2 4 4 4 5 5 7 7 7 7 
e 7 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 3 5 5 5 5 7 
c 8 4 4 3 3 3 3 1 0 0 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 4 6 6 
t 9 5 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 
10 3 3 2 2 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 3 5 5 5 7 7 7 7 
# 11 3 3 3 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 3 4 4 4 5 5 5 7 7 
12 5 5 4 4 4 4 3 2 1 0 1 1 1 2 3 4 4 4 4 4 
13 6 6 5 4 4 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
14 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 3 4 4 5 6 6 6 7 7 7 7 8 
15 2 2 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 4 5 6 6 6 6 7 
16 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 4 4 4 5 6 6 7 7 
Table 3.9: The raw number of classification errors for the first repetition of 
treatment {6, 1} 
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Token Value (Cutpoint) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 91011121314151617181920 
1 232323 5 5 5 5 5 310 8242423313140585867 
2 2215171712161616161616161115151510234150 
s 3 5445452718181818182727363636363636363636 
u 4 18 9 9 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 92727273645454545 
b 5 18 9 0 0 0 0 0 9 91818182754545454636363 
J 6 18181818 9 0 0 0 91818363636454563636363 
e 7 3131222213131310102222222219244141414159 
c 8 1111 2 2 2 2 220293745454545455454627 979 
t 9 301212121212121212121212 924241941394653 
10 27271818 9 0 0 0 9 9 9 92745454563636363 
# 11 1818181818181814191914364545455454547272 
12 9 9 0 0 0 0 0 9182745454554637272727272 
13 191910 1 1 11010 93535354444445353535353 
14 44353535262617 9192820213030293737373746 
15 22221313 4 4 413131313132034415050505059 
16 3012122121211926262621233030283442425151 
Table 3.10: T he raw numl)('r of class ifi cation errors for the first rf'pd it ion of 
t reatmen t {6, 9} 
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JW data Our data 
MRS= 1.33 .50 .37 
(240) (90) 
MRS= 3.33 .20 .05 
(520) (56) 
Table 3.11: Contribution rates. Comparison to TW data, when MRS= 1.33 
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Classification Error Rates 
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Figure 3.2: Classification errors aggregated over all subjects shown for all 
treatments with an endowment condition of one. 
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Classification Error Rates 
Various Cutpoints, Endowment of 9 
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F igure :3.:3: C lassificat ion errors aggregated over a ll subjects shown for all 
treatments with an endowment cond it ion of n ine. 
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Rate of Investment in Public Exchange 
v =3 
1- endowment of 1 ....... endowment of 9 
Figure 3.4: Tlw aggregate percentage of tokens invested in the public ex-
change vs. the marginal rate of substitution, plotted for both the <'nclowm<'nt 
of one and the <'ndowment of nine conditions. V = 3. 
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1- endowment of 1 ....... endowment of 9 
F igure 3.5: The' aggregate pC' tTC'ntage of toke ns invested in t hC' public ex-
cha nge vs. t lw ma rginal rate of substit ution , p lotted fo r both t hC' C'nclowrnent 
of o ne a nd thC' e ndowme nt o f nine cond it ions. V = 6. 
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1- endowment of 1 ....... endowment of 9 
Figure 3.6: The aggregate percentage of tokens invested in the public ex-
change vs. the marginal rate of substitution, plotted for both the endowmC'nt 
of one and the endowment of nine conditions. V = 10. 
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Rate of Investment in Public Exchange 
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MRS 
j- endowment of 1 ....... endowment of 9 
Figure 3. 7: ThC' aggregate per\cntage of tokens invested in th<' public ex-
change vs. tlw marginal rate of substitution , plotted for both the <'ndowmcnt 
of one and thC' C'ndowment of ninC' \onditions. V = 10. 
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Estimated Response Functions 
Probit Model #3 
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figurf' :1.0: Estimalf'd culpoi nt s measured as de\' iation from \"ash pla.y (in 

























Frequency (out of 128 observations) 
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Cutpoint (deviation from Nash) 
~Experienced D Inexperienced 
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Classification minimizing cutpoints 
Figur<' 1.10: Estimated cutpoints measured as deviation from l"ash play (i n 
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Replication of IW 
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--- Isaac-Walker ---+-Our Data 
Figure 3.12: TI<'plica.tion of homogeneous preference experimc·nts with V = 
6, r = 20, X = q (t\fTIS= 3.:1). 
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Response Function 
Reveal vs. No Reveal 






0.0670.267 0.5 0.733 1 1.2 1.5 1.833 2.5 3 .333 5 6.667 
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---No Reveal -+-Reveal 
Figure' 3.13: P.mpirical rC'sponsf' function with (reveal) and without (no re-
veal) publicly rf'portcd tokC'n ,·a\uC's. 
